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COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES AFTER PADILLA V. KENTUCKY: 
FROM PUNISHMENT TO REGULATION 
MARGARET COLGATE LOVE* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article analyzes the scope of Padilla v. Kentucky, concluding that its 
logic extends beyond deportation to many other severe and certain 
consequences of conviction that are imposed by operation of law rather than 
by the sentencing court.  It proposes a set of reforms that would limit the 
disruptive effect of these so-called “collateral consequences” on the guilty 
plea process and make a defense lawyer’s job easier.  Part I describes a case 
currently pending in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that may yield some 
important clues about how broadly the Padilla doctrine will be applied to 
status-generated consequences other than deportation.  At issue in 
Commonwealth v. Abraham is whether a retired public school teacher should 
have been warned by his lawyer that pleading guilty to a misdemeanor sex 
offense would result in the permanent forfeiture of his vested pension benefits.  
Part II looks at the collateral consequences doctrine as applied by the courts 
before Padilla to demonstrate its weakness in the Sixth Amendment context.  It 
then examines the Padilla decision itself and its progeny to date and proposes a 
test for determining when a lawyer should be constitutionally required to notify 
a client about a particular legal consequence of conviction.  It concludes that 
the pension forfeiture at issue in Abraham meets that test.  Part III proposes 
three non-constitutional reforms to complete Padilla’s unfinished business 
where the substance of plea agreements is concerned.  The goal of these 
reforms is to minimize the extent to which harsh categorical sanctions 
destabilize the plea process on which the justice system has come to depend.  
Using principles set forth in the ABA Criminal Justice Standards, the Article 
recommends that jurisdictions should 1) compile and disseminate information 
about collateral sanctions; 2) eliminate those collateral sanctions that are 
disproportionately severe or bear only a tenuous relationship to the crime; and 
3) provide timely and effective ways to avoid or mitigate the sanctions that 
 
* Law Office of Margaret Love.  Chair, Drafting Committee of the ABA Criminal Justice 
Standards on Collateral Sanctions and Discretionary Disqualification of Convicted Persons, 2001-
2004; Email: margaretlove@pardonlaw.com.  I am grateful to Jenny Roberts and Nancy King for 
their helpful comments on an earlier version of this Article. 
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remain.  These reforms will not only shore up the plea system, they will propel 
a move away from a punitive model of collateral consequences that is 
frequently self-defeating and unfair to one that can be justified in both moral 
and utilitarian terms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky1 in March 2010 
struck even veteran Court-watchers as a bolt from the blue.  In finding that a 
non-citizen defendant should have been advised by his lawyer that pleading 
guilty to drug charges would almost certainly result in his deportation, the 
Court for the first time extended the constitutional right to counsel to the 
substance of a guilty plea and to a consequence of conviction that is not part of 
the court-imposed sentence.  The concurring Justices, noting the “longstanding 
and unanimous position of the federal courts” that lawyers need not inform 
their clients about this “collateral” consequence of conviction, characterized 
the Court’s decision “a major upheaval in Sixth Amendment law” that “will 
 
 1. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
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lead to much confusion and needless litigation.”2  The dissenters warned that 
the logic—and thus the reach—of the Court’s decision could not be limited 
“except by judicial caprice.”3 
In retrospect, Padilla should not have come as such a surprise in light of 
two modern phenomena: the dominance of guilty pleas over trials in the 
disposition of criminal cases, and the large and growing role of conviction in 
overall regulatory policy.  As to the first, Padilla has been explained in terms 
of the perceived need to regulate “a free market that sometimes resembled a 
Turkish Bazaar.”4  The decision thus represents an important step toward 
imposing constitutional discipline on a typically hidden and frequently one-
sided process of negotiation that has become the norm for disposing of 
criminal cases.5  As to the second, Padilla recognizes the need to make 
participants in a criminal case aware of non-criminal “collateral”6 penalties 
 
 2. Id. at 1487, 1491 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 3. Id. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 4. Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to 
Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (2011). 
 5. The Padilla Court took note of the fact that in 2003, 95% of criminal convictions 
resulted from pleas. 130 S. Ct. at 1485 n.13; see also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 
2527, 2540 (2009) (noting “only a small fraction of . . . cases actually proceed to trial,” relying on 
the 5% figure provided in Brief for Law Professors as Amici Curiae).  More recent studies 
confirm this percentage.  See THOMAS H. COHEN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2006 1 (2006), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc06.pdf.  If federal criminal cases are an accurate 
barometer of national trends, the percentage of cases resolved by plea has actually increased since 
Padilla was decided.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS tbl.5.22.2010 (2010), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t522 
2010.pdf (noting that the percentage of federal cases disposed of by plea has increased since 2003 
from 96.3% to 97.4%); U.S. FED. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL 
SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.10 (2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/ 
Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2010/Table10.pdf (noting the same). 
 6. The term “collateral consequences” has been used for forty years to describe the various 
legal penalties and disabilities to which people are exposed when they are convicted of a crime 
based on their status as a convicted person.  See Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 593–94 (1960) 
(Warren, C.J., dissenting) (“Conviction of a felony imposes a status upon a person which not only 
makes him vulnerable to future sanctions through new civil disability statutes, but which also 
seriously affects his reputation and economic opportunities.”).  See generally Gabriel J. Chin, The 
New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2012) (describing the historical punishment of civil death and “its revival in the 
form of a system of collateral consequences imposed by positive law based on criminal 
conviction.”).  The Padilla court cast some doubt on the general usefulness of the term 
“collateral,” at least for the purpose of defining lawyers’ obligations to their clients under the 
Sixth Amendment: “We . . . have never applied a distinction between direct and collateral 
consequences to define the scope of constitutionally ‘reasonable professional assistance.’”  130 S. 
Ct. at 1481 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)).  Post-Padilla, 
suggested alternative technology seems either too narrow to capture the full range of 
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that are frequently a crime’s most serious punishment.7  Until Padilla, the so-
called “collateral consequences doctrine” kept defendants considering a guilty 
plea in the dark about severe statutory or regulatory penalties like deportation 
 
consequences about which practitioners and affected individuals should be aware, see, e.g., 
McGregor Smyth, From “Collateral” to “Integral”: The Seismic Evolution of Padilla v. 
Kentucky and Its Impact on Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54 HOW. L.J. 795, 821–27 (2011) 
(suggesting “enmeshed penalties” as an alternative term), or too broad to capture the highly 
punitive quality of many modern-day consequences of conviction.  Thus, calling penalties that 
occur immediately and automatically “indirect” seems misleading, while using the term “civil” to 
describe these penalties gives criminal courts and practitioners permission to ignore them.  For 
lack of a more legally precise descriptor, and in light of its general acceptance in the lexicon, this 
Article uses the term “collateral consequences” to describe the legal consequences of conviction 
that are not part of the court-imposed sentence.  Part III of this Article also uses the term 
“collateral sanction” to designate a penalty that is imposed automatically upon conviction, as 
distinguished from a penalty that occurs as a result of some subsequent intervening action or 
discretionary decision.  See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS 
AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS Standard 19-1.1(a) (3d ed. 
2004).  The Introduction to the Collateral Sanctions Standards notes that 
The convicted person’s reduced legal status is derived from the ancient Greek concept of 
“infamy,” or the penalty of “outlawry” among the German tribes.  The idea that criminals 
should be separated from the rest of society led to “civil death” in the Middle Ages and to 
exile by “transportation” during the Enlightenment.  The American colonies, and later the 
United States, followed the European practice of excluding convicted persons from many 
rights and privileges of citizenship. 
Id. at 7 n.1 (citation omitted). 
 7. See Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret Love, Status as Punishment: A Critical Guide to Padilla 
v. Kentucky, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2010, at 21, 22 (“Imposing collateral consequences has become an 
increasingly important function of the criminal justice system, so that they have to all intents and 
purposes become part and parcel of the criminal case.”).  The public safety implications of this 
regime of collateral consequences have recently been recognized by the Attorney General of the 
United States in a letter to the attorney general of each state.  See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., 
U.S. Att’y Gen., to Attorneys General (Apr. 18, 2011), available at http://www.national 
reentryresourcecenter.org/documents/0000/1088/Reentry_Council_AG_Letter.pdf (“[G]ainful 
employment and stable housing are key factors that enable people with criminal convictions to 
avoid future arrests and incarceration.”).  Their racial implications have also been recognized.  
See, e.g., Margaret Colgate Love, Paying Their Debt to Society: Forgiveness, Redemption, and 
the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, 54 HOW. L.J. 753, 755–56 (2011) (“The 
fact that people of color are disproportionately branded and ostracized as criminals should be 
cause for alarm.” (citing MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION 
IN THE AGE OF COLOR BLINDNESS (2010))). 
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or eviction or loss of employment until it was too late to avoid them.8  After 
Padilla, the days of the “secret sentence”9 may be numbered. 
By requiring consideration of collateral consequences in plea negotiations, 
the Padilla decision could threaten the stability of a system of disposing of 
criminal cases on which the justice system has come to depend.  This is 
particularly true if Padilla’s logic is extended to consequences other than 
deportation.  The Padilla Court twice described deportation as “unique,” as if 
at pains to convince itself of the limited reach of its own holding, coyly 
declining to predict the future usefulness of the collateral consequences 
doctrine to test a lawyer’s Sixth Amendment obligation in the plea context.10  
But Padilla’s logic points to that doctrine’s early demise, so that it remains 
only to play out the hand in the lower courts.11  In the meantime, even basic 
terminology is in flux,12 and questions are being raised about misdemeanants’ 
right to counsel at plea even if they face no prison time.13 
The question of Padilla’s scope is the subject of this Article.  Part I 
describes a case currently pending in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that 
may yield some important clues about how broadly the Padilla doctrine will be 
applied to status-generated consequences beyond the immigration context.  At 
issue in Commonwealth v. Abraham is whether a criminal defense lawyer 
should have warned his client, a retired public school teacher, that pleading 
 
 8. See generally Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct 
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent 
Predators,” 93 MINN. L. REV. 670 (2008) (describing the origins and application of the 
“collateral consequences doctrine” in lower courts after Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 
(1970)). 
 9. See Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the 
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 699 (2002). 
 10. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (“Whether [the distinction between direct and collateral 
consequences] is appropriate is a question we need not consider in this case because of the unique 
nature of deportation.”); id. at 1482 (“Deportation as a  consequence of a criminal conviction 
is . . . uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or collateral consequence.”). 
 11. See infra Part II.C. 
 12. See supra note 6. 
 13. If Padilla requires competent counsel in connection with any guilty plea that triggers the 
penalty of deportation, it appears to extend the right to counsel set forth in Alabama v. Shelton.  
535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002) (holding that “a suspended sentence that may ‘end up in the actual 
deprivation of a person’s liberty’ may not be imposed unless the defendant was accorded ‘the 
guiding hand of counsel’ in the prosecution for the crime charged” (quoting Argersinger v. 
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972))); see Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining 
Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) 
(manuscript at 30) (“As the nascent post-Padilla misdemeanor jurisprudence develops, it will 
send a message to defenders that warnings about deportation, and possibly other severe collateral 
consequences, are not only mandated in all levels of cases, but that the failure to warn is most 
likely going to prejudice the misdemeanor client.”), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa 
pers.cfm?abstract_id=1963788. 
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guilty to a misdemeanor sex offense would result in the permanent forfeiture of 
his vested pension benefits.14  Part II looks at the collateral consequences 
doctrine as applied by the courts before Padilla to demonstrate the weakness of 
that doctrine in the Sixth Amendment context.  It then examines the Padilla 
decision itself, concluding that its logic extends beyond deportation to many 
other severe and certain consequences of conviction that are imposed by 
operation of law rather than by the sentencing court.  Post-Padilla case law 
bears out this analysis.  Part II then proposes a test for determining when the 
Sixth Amendment requires a lawyer to notify a client about a particular 
consequence, and concludes that the pension forfeiture at issue in Abraham 
meets that test. 
Part III proposes a set of three non-constitutional reforms “to complete 
Padilla’s unfinished business” where the substance of plea agreements is 
concerned.15  The goal of these proposed reforms is to minimize the extent to 
which harsh categorical sanctions disrupt and destabilize the plea process on 
which the justice system has come to depend.  Using principles set forth in the 
ABA Criminal Justice Standards,16 the Article recommends that jurisdictions 
should 1) compile and disseminate information about collateral sanctions; 2) 
eliminate sanctions that are disproportionately severe or bear only a tenuous 
relationship to the crime; and 3) provide timely and effective ways to avoid or 
mitigate those sanctions that remain.  These reforms, if adopted, will not only 
shore up the plea system, they will also propel a move away from a punitive 
model of collateral consequences that is frequently self-defeating and unfair, 
toward one that can be justified in both moral and utilitarian terms. 
I.  TESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF PADILLA V. KENTUCKY:  
COMMONWEALTH V. ABRAHAM 
Joseph Abraham had been teaching science at Alderdice High School in 
Pittsburgh for more than twenty years when he offered a fifteen-year-old 
student in his robotics class $300 to have sex with him and also touched her 
buttocks.17  As recounted in the court’s opinion, “[h]e gave her one of his 
business cards and wrote his private cell phone number on it.”18  Several 
months later, the student told a friend about the incident, the friend told a 
 
 14. 996 A.2d 1090, 1091 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010), appeal granted in part, 9 A.3d 1133 (Pa. 
2010).  As recounted in this Article, the facts of the Abraham case contained in the opinion of the 
Superior Court are supplemented by the briefs of the parties filed in the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court and an interview with Abraham’s appellate counsel. 
 15. Bibas, supra note 4, at 1117.  Professor Bibas is concerned primarily with Padilla’s 
impact on the plea process, while this Article is concerned primarily with Padilla’s impact on the 
substance of the resulting bargain. 
 16. See infra Part III.B. 
 17. Abraham, 996 A.2d at 1091. 
 18. Id. 
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teacher, and the teacher told the principal.19  The student eventually related 
what had happened and turned the business card over to the school police.20  
“Abraham, sixty-seven years old at the time of the incident, was allowed to 
retire with his pension.”21 
Abraham was also charged criminally.22  The prosecutor agreed to let him 
plead to two misdemeanors, corruption of a minor and indecent assault, and his 
lawyer encouraged him to take the offer and “get on with his life.”23  Abraham 
took his lawyer’s advice, and in December 2008 was sentenced to three years’ 
probation.24  His lawyer assured him that neither of the offenses to which he 
pled guilty would require him to register as a sex offender.25 
The lawyer’s advice was accurate as far as it went: Abraham was not 
required to register as a sex offender.  But six weeks after his sentencing he 
received a letter from the state pension board notifying him that his indecent 
assault conviction required the automatic and permanent forfeiture of his 
vested pension benefits.26  Shocked and dismayed, he moved to withdraw his 
plea, claiming that his lawyer had failed to advise him about the mandatory 
pension forfeiture, and that this default had deprived him of his constitutional 
right to effective assistance of counsel.27  He argued that his lawyer had been 
fully aware of how important his pension was to him, that the forfeiture 
penalty was a clear and unambiguous result of conviction even for a minor sex 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Abraham was originally charged with four misdemeanors: Endangering the Welfare of 
Children, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4304(a)(1) (West 2007); Corruption of Minors, 18 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6301(a)(1) (West 2010); Indecent Assault upon a Person Less than 16 Years 
of Age, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.  § 3126(a)(8) (West 2006); Criminal Solicitation, 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 902(a) (West 1973); see Abraham, 996 A.2d at 1091. 
 23. Interview with William Stickman, appellate counsel for Abraham (May 5, 2011) (on file 
with author). 
 24. Abraham, 996 A.2d at 1091. 
 25. None of the four misdemeanor offenses with which Abraham was originally charged 
qualify for registration under Pennsylvania’s Megan’s law.  See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 
9795.1 (West 2011).  While certain sections of the indecent assault statute do qualify for 
registration, the particular section under which Abraham was charged is graded as a second 
degree misdemeanor and as such does not require registration.  See id. § 9795.1(a) (a violation of 
Section 1326 requires registration only where the offense is graded as a misdemeanor of the first 
degree or higher). 
 26. See Interview with William Stickman, supra note 23; Abraham, 996 A.2d at 1091 (citing 
43 PA. STAT. § 1312 (2004) (listing offenses qualifying for pension forfeiture)).  There is no 
indication in the record that any of the participants in Abraham’s case, including the prosecutor 
and sentencing court, was aware that this charge carried with it the forfeiture penalty.  As 
explained earlier, the particular offense that resulted in forfeiture of Mr. Abraham’s pension did 
not require him to register as a sex offender.  See supra note 25. 
 27. Abraham, 996 A.2d at 1092. 
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offense, and that he would never have agreed to plead guilty to the indecent 
assault charge if he had known it would result in the permanent loss of his 
primary source of income.28  The post-conviction court refused to allow 
Abraham to withdraw his plea, relying on a Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
holding that a defense lawyer’s failure to advise a client about the immigration 
consequences of conviction was irrelevant to the validity of the client’s guilty 
plea.29  Because the pension forfeiture, like deportation, took effect without 
action by the sentencing court, it was a “collateral” consequence of conviction 
about which no warning was required.30  Invoking the “collateral consequences 
doctrine,” the court dismissed Abraham’s post-conviction motion as “patently 
frivolous.”31 
Abraham had better luck in the court of appeals, which applied the same 
analytical framework to his claim but reached a different result.  The court of 
appeals noted that the Supreme Court’s then-recent Padilla decision had cast 
some doubt on the continued viability of the collateral consequences doctrine 
in the Sixth Amendment context, and that Padilla had effectively overruled the 
Pennsylvania precedent on which the post-conviction court had relied.32  Yet 
the court was reluctant to abandon altogether the familiar construct: “[T]he 
direct/collateral analysis . . . might still be useful if the nature of the action is 
not as ‘intimately connected’ to the criminal process as deportation.”33 
 
 28. In his submission to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Abraham argued that his counsel 
had information about his personal circumstances that should have led him to inquire about the 
consequences of the plea for his retirement benefits: 
At all times during the representation, [his defense lawyer] knew that Mr. Abraham was a 
retired public school teacher receiving a public-school pension.  In fact, Mr. Abraham 
specifically discussed with [his attorney] the implications of early retirement on his 
pension—i.e., a one hundred dollar ($100.00) per month decrease in benefits.  [His 
lawyer] explained to him that early retirement was his best option.  Never at any time did 
[his lawyer] so much as suggest to Mr. Abraham that his pension could be implicated or 
in any way put at risk depending on his plea to any of the charges against him.  Mr. 
Abraham would never have consented to a plea agreement which would place his pension 
in jeopardy, as it was his primary source of income and would continue to provide income 
to his wife should he die. 
Brief of the Appellee at 2, Commonwealth v. Abraham, No. 36 WAP 2010 (Pa. 2010) (citations 
omitted). 
 29. Abraham, 996 A.2d at 1092 (noting the post-conviction court’s reliance on 
Commonwealth v. Frometa, 555 A.2d 92 (Pa. 1989), for the proposition that failure to inform 
about immigration consequences does not invalidate plea).  At the time, Frometa was consistent 
with the law in every federal circuit and most states.  See Chin & Holmes, supra note 9, at 704–
08. 
 30. Brief for Appellant at 8, Commonwealth v. Abraham, No. 36 WAP 2010 (Pa. 2010). 
 31. Id. at 6 (citation omitted). 
 32. Abraham, 996 A.2d at 1092–93. 
 33. Id. at 1092. 
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The court then turned to the question of whether to characterize pension 
forfeiture as “collateral” or “direct.”34  Relying on analysis borrowed from ex 
post facto and due process cases,35  the court concluded that pension forfeiture 
was “akin to a fine” and “punitive in nature,” and therefore a “penal” as 
opposed to a “civil” consequence.36  It was a short further step to conclude that 
forfeiture was a “direct” rather than a “collateral” consequence of conviction 
about which Abraham should have been warned before giving up his right to 
put the government to its proof.37  The court of appeals returned the case to the 
lower court to determine whether Abraham had been prejudiced by his 
lawyer’s deficient performance.38 
The government appealed, arguing that Padilla had left the collateral 
consequences doctrine undisturbed except where deportation is concerned, and 
that pension forfeiture falls squarely within the “collateral” category because it 
is “a civil requirement over which a sentencing judge has no control.”39  Citing 
the high percentage of criminal cases resolved by plea, it warned that “[e]ven 
an incremental weakening in the finality of pleas would have a dramatic effect 
on the integrity and effectiveness of . . . Pennsylvania’s criminal justice 
system.”40  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review to consider 
whether, in light of Padilla, the direct/collateral distinction remains an 
appropriate test of defense counsel’s duty of effective representation; and, if it 
does, how pension forfeiture should be characterized.41 
 
 34. Id. at 1093. 
 35. See id.: 
Determination of ex post facto consequences and constitutionally effective counsel both 
address due process concerns, and as such, there is no reason why an analysis used in one 
situation cannot be used in the other.  Specifically, a consequence that is punitive in 
nature implicates ex post facto applications and punitive consequence is also a 
determining factor under Padilla. 
Id. 
 36. Id. at 1094. 
 37. The court of appeals did not address the question whether the court accepting the plea 
ought also to have advised Mr. Abraham about the likelihood of pension forfeiture as a matter of 
due process, though this would appear to be a natural extension of its holding that the pension 
forfeiture was a direct consequence of conviction.  See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 38. Abraham, 996 A.2d at 1095.  The Sixth Amendment test for ineffective assistance of 
counsel under Strickland v. Washington is discussed in Part II.  Failure to warn about a penalty 
that is determined to be punitive may raise due process as well as Sixth Amendment concerns.  
See infra Part II. 
 39. Brief for Appellant, supra note 30, at 18 (citing Commonwealth v. Duffey, 639 A.2d 
1174, 1176–77 (Pa. 1994)). 
 40. Id. at 14. 
 41. Commonwealth v. Abraham, 9 A.3d 1133, 1133 (Pa. 2010) (limiting review to the 
following questions: “(1) Whether, in light of Padilla v. Kentucky, the distinction in Pennsylvania 
between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of constitutionally ‘reasonable 
professional assistance’ required under Strickland v. Washington is appropriate? (2) If so, whether 
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The Abraham case presents an opportunity to consider how far the Padilla 
holding extends beyond deportation, and how much clients are entitled to 
expect by way of advice from counsel about applicable collateral penalties 
before entering a guilty plea.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has identified 
the first question presented in the case as precisely the one left open by Padilla 
itself: when, if ever, is it appropriate to distinguish between direct and 
collateral consequences in determining counsel’s constitutional obligation to 
advise a client considering a plea.42  Only if the collateral consequences 
doctrine retains some vitality in the Sixth Amendment context after Padilla 
will it be necessary to consider how pension forfeiture should be categorized.  
To take the pulse of the collateral consequences doctrine, the following section 
looks at the pre-Padilla case law, at Padilla itself, and at some early 
applications of Padilla to status-generated consequences other than 
deportation. 
II.  COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES IN THE COURTS BEFORE AND AFTER PADILLA 
A. A Short History of the Collateral Consequences Doctrine 
For many years, courts drew a bright doctrinal line between the “direct” 
consequences of conviction, which a criminal defendant had a right to know 
about before entering a guilty plea, and “collateral” consequences that were 
considered constitutionally irrelevant to that decision, no matter how important 
they might be to the defendant.  The so-called collateral consequences doctrine 
is generally traced to the 1970 case of Brady v. United States, which dealt with 
a court’s obligations under the Due Process Clause to ensure that a guilty plea 
is knowing and voluntary.43  The Brady Court said that “[a] plea of guilty 
entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences . . . must stand unless 
induced by threats . . . , misrepresentation . . . , or perhaps by promises that are 
by their nature improper.”44  Though Brady itself was primarily concerned 
with the voluntariness of the defendant’s plea, the lower courts latched onto its 
dictum about “direct consequences” when confronted with situations in which 
a defendant sought to undo a plea agreement because of imperfect knowledge 
 
the forfeiture of a pension that stems from a public school teacher’s negotiated plea to crimes 
committed in the scope of his employment is a collateral consequence of a criminal conviction 
which relieves counsel from any affirmative duty to investigate and advise?” (citations omitted)).  
The case was argued in April 2011, and as of March 1, 2012 was awaiting decision. 
 42. Id. 
 43. 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). 
 44. Id. at 755 (emphasis added) (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 
(5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)). 
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of its consequences.45  The rule developed that while courts must admonish 
defendants about the “direct” consequences of the plea (those the court itself 
imposed), they need not inform them about “collateral” consequences (those 
imposed by law or other official action).46 
One problem with this formula was that there was no clear dividing line 
between “direct” and “collateral” consequences.  Some courts defined a 
“direct” consequence in terms of its certainty and punitive intent, using a 
formula first advanced by the Fourth Circuit in a case involving the sentencing 
court’s failure to warn about the possibility of civil commitment: No warning 
was required because this consequence did not have a “definite, immediate and 
largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant’s punishment.”47  Later 
cases held that while a consequence like sex offender registration might meet 
the “definite, immediate and largely automatic” part of this test, it failed to 
qualify as “punishment” because the legislative purpose was “remedial and 
civil rather than punitive.”48  On the other hand, the Delaware Supreme Court 
applied the punishment test to set aside a plea where a drug offender was not 
warned that his plea would result in the automatic revocation of his driver’s 
license.49  A second familiar test of whether a consequence was “direct” or 
“collateral” was whether the court had the power to impose or limit it.50  Thus, 
for example, in People v. Ford, the New York Court of Appeals held that 
consequences “peculiar to the individual’s personal circumstances and . . . not 
within the control of the court system” were collateral for due process 
 
 45. See, e.g., United States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en banc) (“We 
presume that the Supreme Court meant what it said when it used the word direct; by doing so, it 
excluded collateral consequences.”). 
 46. See Roberts, supra note 8, at 689–93. 
 47. Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973). 
 48. Mitschke v. State, 129 S.W.3d 130, 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 
 49. Barkley v. State, 724 A.2d 558, 561 (Del. 1999) (holding that automatic license 
revocation was a “direct penal consequence” about which the defendant should have been warned 
by the court before his plea). 
 50. See, e.g., El-Nobani v. United States, 287 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
deportation is a collateral consequence about which no warning is required because it “remains 
beyond the control and responsibility of the district court” (citation omitted)); United States v. 
Gonzales, 202 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 2000) (“However ‘automatically’ Gonzalez’s deportation . . . 
might follow from his conviction, it remains beyond the control and responsibility of the district 
court in which that conviction was entered and it thus remains a collateral consequence thereof.”); 
United States v. Littlejohn, 224 F.3d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a court must advise 
about automatic loss of welfare benefits because it was not “contingent upon action taken by an 
individual  or individuals other [than] the sentencing court”); State v. Bellamy, 835 A.2d 1231, 
1238 (N.J. 2003) (holding that while civil commitment is neither direct nor collateral, 
fundamental fairness requires that a trial court ensure defendant understands that there is a 
possibility of future indefinite commitment). 
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purposes.51  Under either the punishment test or the judicial authority test, 
deportation was universally considered a “collateral” consequence.52  Courts 
struggled with which side of the direct/collateral line to place incidents of the 
sentence like parole eligibility, mandatory supervision, sentence enhancement, 
and consecutive sentences, with the deciding factor generally being whether a 
defendant had been given incorrect advice.53 
Until 1984, no doctrinal distinction was made between the advisement 
obligations of court and counsel in connection with a guilty plea.  That 
changed after the Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. Washington made 
clear that the right to counsel in a criminal proceeding meant the right to 
competent counsel.54  The following year, Hill v. Lockhart extended Strickland 
to a lawyer’s performance before trial,55 and defendants began to challenge 
their convictions based upon the quality of their lawyer’s advice in the plea 
process.56  Complaints about a lawyer’s performance frequently involved a 
failure to warn about the same consequences of conviction that were the 
subject of complaints about the thoroughness of the court’s admonishment.  
Courts applied the same formalistic distinction between direct and collateral 
consequences to test a lawyer’s Sixth Amendment advisement obligations that 
they applied to test their own obligations under the Due Process Clause, 
ignoring the very different institutional roles and responsibilities of court and 
counsel at the guilty plea stage.57  In this way, the advisement duties of court 
 
 51. 657 N.E.2d 265, 268, 269 (N.Y. 1995) (holding that court was not required to notify 
defendant of deportation consequences). 
 52. See Chin & Holmes, supra note 9, at 705 nn.50–57 (listing cases classifying deportation 
as a collateral consequence about which no warning is required). 
 53. Compare Bustos v. White, 521 F.3d 321, 326 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding ineligibility for 
parole a collateral consequence about which defendant need not be warned), and United States v. 
Kikuyama, 109 F.3d 536, 538 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding consecutive nature of sentences is a 
“collateral consequence” of guilty plea of which defendant need not be informed by court), with 
Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 963 (Colo. 1999) (en banc) (stating parole eligibility is a direct 
consequence of a guilty plea about which the court must advise defendant), and People v. Catu, 
825 N.E.2d 1081, 1082 (N.Y. 2005) (holding supervised release to be a direct consequence about 
which court required to warn). 
 54. 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984). 
 55. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). 
 56. See Chin & Holmes, supra note 9, at 699, 712. 
 57. See Roberts, supra note 8, at 694–96 (discussing Page v. State, 615 S.E.2d 740 (S.C. 
2005), which treats the advisement duties of court and counsel as interchangeable).  Chin & 
Holmes have pointed out the fallacy of equating the advisement roles of court and counsel: 
[J]ust as defense counsel and the court have different duties of loyalty, investigation, and 
legal research as a result of their distinct roles as advocate and decisionmaker, there is no 
reason to assume that their obligations of advising the accused of the risks and benefits of 
pleading guilty should be identical.  The judge is charged with ensuring that the plea is 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent; counsel’s job is to assist with the determination that a 
plea is a good idea, which encompasses a broader range of consideration. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES AFTER PADILLA V. KENTUCKY 99 
and counsel came to be treated as generally coextensive, with defense counsel 
required to do no more than duplicate what was already required of the court.  
If a penalty was imposed by operation of law58 rather than by the court’s 
judgment, the defendant considering a guilty plea could be left entirely in the 
dark about what might be a matter of great personal moment.59 
Doctrinal manipulation offered a partial solution to this uncomfortable 
situation: A defendant who was given affirmatively incorrect advice about a 
particular consequence of conviction, whether by his own lawyer or by the 
court or prosecutor, might have a constitutional basis for withdrawing his 
guilty plea.60  This “misadvice exception” to the collateral consequences rule 
meant that counsel’s only obligation was to refrain from giving his client bad 
advice.  This in turn led to what the Court in Padilla would describe as the 
“absurd” result of giving counsel “an incentive to remain silent on matters of 
great importance, even when answers are readily available.”61 
After Strickland, the days of the neat dichotomy between direct and 
collateral consequences were numbered, at least where the duty of counsel was 
concerned.  In retrospect, it is not clear why a lawyer’s duty under the Sixth 
Amendment should ever have been thought the same as the duty of a court 
 
Chin & Holmes, supra note 9, at 727; see also id. at 724–36 (describing five categories of cases 
that suggest invalidity of collateral consequences doctrine as applied to Sixth Amendment duty of 
counsel). 
 58. Penalties imposed “by operation of law” include those imposed by statute, by regulation, 
or by contract.  See infra Part III. 
 59. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1487 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) 
(“‘[V]irtually all jurisdictions’—including ‘eleven federal circuits, more than thirty states, and the 
District of Columbia’—‘hold that defense counsel need not discuss with their clients the 
collateral consequences of a conviction,’ including deportation.” (quoting Chin & Holmes, supra 
note 9, at 697, 699)). 
 60. See, e.g., United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 188 (2d Cir. 2002) (misadvice by 
counsel about immigration consequences); Hill v. Lockhart, 894 F.2d 1009, 1010 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(en banc) (misadvice by counsel about parole eligibility); United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 
36–37 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (misadvice by prosecutor about immigration consequences); United 
States v. Singh, 305 F. Supp. 2d 109, 111 (D.D.C. 2004) (misadvice by court and prosecutor 
about immigration consequences).  See generally Jenny Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss: 
Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. 
REV. 119, 131–139 (2009) (criticizing the misadvice rule as a “flawed exception to the flawed 
collateral-consequences rule”).  In its brief in the Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky, 
Kentucky described the misadvice doctrine as “result-driven, incestuous[, and] completely 
lacking in legal or rational bases.”  Brief for Respondent at 31, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-
615). 
 61. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484.  The Court held that “‘there is no relevant difference 
‘between an act of commission and an act of omission’ in this context.”  Id. (citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (“The court must then determine whether, in light of all 
the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally 
competent assistance.”)). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
100 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXI:87 
under the Due Process Clause.62  The considerations that make the 
direct/collateral distinction sensible from the standpoint of institutional 
competence when applied to a court, do not apply to criminal defense lawyers’ 
relationships with their clients.63  A court can be expected to know about 
penalties it has control over.  It may also be expected to know about 
consequences that are necessarily incident to conviction of a particular offense, 
such as ineligibility for parole or sentencing enhancements or sex offender 
registration.  However, a court cannot, and perhaps should not, be expected to 
know what consequences might be important to a particular criminal defendant 
by virtue of some personal characteristic or circumstance, such as citizenship 
or employment or residence.  Even where a court is obligated by its own rules 
to advise a defendant about certain consequences of a guilty plea, that duty is 
necessarily a general one, and not dependent upon anything the court knows 
about the defendant’s particular circumstances.64 
By contrast, a defense lawyer is in a position to find out what is important 
to his client and is ethically obligated to use what he knows about his client’s 
situation to get the best deal he can in negotiating with the government.  In the 
past twenty years, professional standards have raised the bar on a defense 
lawyer’s duty to advise the client about the consequences of a guilty plea.65  To 
say that defense counsel’s duty of advisement under the Sixth Amendment is 
no greater than that of a court under the Due Process Clause is to say that 
defense counsel has no duty at all.  The poverty of the collateral consequences 
doctrine in the Sixth Amendment context is revealed in its exception for 
erroneous advice: While courts at least have an affirmative obligation under 
the Due Process Clause and court rules to ensure that a defendant’s plea is 
 
 62. The reasons why collateral consequences were not considered a proper subject of 
advisement until relatively recently include their increase in number and severity since 1980 and 
the failure of relief mechanisms, like pardon.  See Chin & Love, supra note 7, at 24–26. 
 63. See, e.g., Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (“The Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected 
Padilla’s ineffectiveness claim on the ground that the advice he sought about the risk of 
deportation concerned only collateral matters, i.e., those matters not within the sentencing 
authority of the state trial court.” (citing Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483–84 (Ky. 
2008))). 
 64. Most courts have held post-Padilla that generic judicial admonishments are no substitute 
for advice of counsel.  See, e.g., United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 645–46 (3d. Cir. 2011); 
Commonwealth v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892, 903–04 (Mass. 2011); State v. Sandoval, 249 P.3d 
1015, 1020–21 (Wash. 2011) (en banc).  At the time of this writing, the Florida Supreme Court 
and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals both had this issue under consideration.  See Hernandez 
v. State, 61 So. 3d 1144, 1147–48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), review granted, Nos. SC11-941, 
SC11-1957, 2012 WL 285811 (Fla. Jan. 24, 2012); Ex parte Martinez, No. 13-10-00390-CR, 
2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 5625 (Tex. Ct. App. July 21, 2011), discretionary review granted, No. 
PD-1338-11, 2011 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1640 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 7, 2011). 
 65. See Brief of the Am. Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5–10, 
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651). 
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knowing and voluntary, the misadvice rule gives defense lawyers a perverse 
incentive to tell their clients nothing at all.  That is where the law stood in 
almost every U.S. jurisdiction on March 29, 2010, the day before the Court 
announced its decision in Padilla v. Kentucky. 
B. Padilla v. Kentucky 
In Padilla v. Kentucky, seven Justices ruled that criminal defense lawyers 
must advise their non-citizen clients considering a guilty plea that they are 
likely to be deported as a result.66  The Court explained that “[o]ur 
longstanding Sixth Amendment precedents, the seriousness of deportation as a 
consequence of a criminal plea, and the concomitant impact of deportation on 
families living lawfully in this country demand no less.”67  It was the first time 
the Court had extended the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel to plea negotiations.68  Jose Padilla was a long-time lawful permanent 
resident charged with transporting marijuana in state court in Kentucky.69  He 
agreed to plead guilty after his attorney assured him that he “did not have to 
worry about immigration status since he had been in the country so long.”70  
Actually, his offense rendered him deportable with no opportunity for statutory 
relief, and he was put in deportation proceedings.71  Padilla challenged his plea 
on ineffective assistance grounds, and the Kentucky Supreme Court applied the 
collateral consequences doctrine to conclude, as had almost every other court, 
that his lawyer had no affirmative obligation to advise him about the likelihood 
of deportation.72  The Kentucky court concluded further that it made no 
difference to the outcome that Padilla’s lawyer had given him incorrect advice, 
since collateral consequences are entirely “outside the scope of the guarantee 
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”73 
Justice Stevens, writing for a five-Justice majority, held that Padilla was 
constitutionally entitled to advice from his lawyer that pleading guilty would 
make him deportable.74  In concluding that the lawyer’s failure to give him 
correct advice about the deportation consequences of conviction made his 
performance constitutionally deficient under Strickland’s first prong, the 
opinion pointed out that “deportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes 
the most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen 
 
 66. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See Bibas, supra note 4, at 1120. 
 69. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477. 
 70. Id. at 1478 (quoting Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008)). 
 71. Id. 
 72. See Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 485. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486. 
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defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”75  It also looked to “the 
practice and expectations of the legal community” to determine whether the 
lawyer’s performance had been “reasonable[] under prevailing professional 
norms . . . as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like.”76  
It concluded that “the weight of prevailing professional norms” supported the 
view that advice about the risk of deportation was constitutionally necessary.77  
This conclusion was reinforced by the fact that there was no particular mystery 
about whether conviction would trigger deportation: 
Padilla’s counsel could have easily determined that his plea would make him 
eligible for deportation simply from reading the text of the statute, which 
addresses not some broad classification of crimes but specifically commands 
removal for all controlled substances convictions except for the most trivial of 
marijuana possession offenses.78 
While the extent of the lawyer’s advisory obligation may depend upon how 
clear the law is, the lawyer has a duty to warn the client even when the law is 
not clear: 
When the law is not succinct and straightforward . . . , a criminal defense 
attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal 
charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.  But when the 
deportation consequence is truly clear, as it was in this case, the duty to give 
correct advice is equally clear.79 
The Court noted that Padilla’s counsel had “provided him false assurance” 
about his removability, but it rejected the rule proposed by the Solicitor 
General that a constitutional violation should turn on whether a defendant had 
been affirmatively misadvised.80  Such a rule would lead to two “absurd 
results”: “[I]t would give counsel an incentive to remain silent on matters of 
great importance” and “deny a class of clients least able to represent 
themselves the most rudimentary advice on deportation even when it is readily 
available.”81  The Court remanded the case to the Kentucky courts for a finding 
 
 75. Id. at 1480 (footnote omitted). 
 76. Id. at 1482 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). 
 77. Id. (“[A]uthorities of every stripe—including the American Bar Association, criminal 
defense and public defender organizations, authoritative treatises, and state and city bar 
publications—universally require defense attorneys to advise as to the risk of deportation 
consequences for non-citizen clients.” (citations omitted)).  The Court cited, among other 
authorities, the ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND 
DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-5.1(a) (3d. ed. 1993), and ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY Standard 14-3.2(f) (3d ed. 1999).  These Standards are discussed in 
Part III, infra. 
 78. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. 
 79. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 80. Id. at 1483, 1484. 
 81. Id. 
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on whether Padilla had been prejudiced by his lawyer’s deficient 
performance82: “[T]o obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must 
convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been 
rational under the circumstances.”83  The Court emphasized that its holding 
was limited to the deportation consequence of conviction.84  Noting the 
prevailing rule in most lower courts that defendants need not be told about 
“collateral” consequences, the Court pointed out that it had “never applied a 
distinction between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope” of 
counsel’s duty, and that it need not consider whether such a distinction was 
generally “appropriate” because of the “unique nature of deportation.”85  The 
Court explained deportation’s “uniqueness” in the following terms: 
  We have long recognized that deportation is a particularly severe 
“penalty,” but it is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction.  Although 
removal proceedings are civil in nature, deportation is nevertheless intimately 
related to the criminal process.  Our law has enmeshed criminal convictions 
and the penalty of deportation for nearly a century.  And, importantly, recent 
changes in our immigration law have made removal nearly an automatic result 
for a broad class of noncitizen offenders.  Thus, we find it “most difficult” to 
divorce the penalty from the conviction in the deportation context.86 
Boiled down to their essence, the two salient characteristics advanced by 
the Court in support of deportation’s “uniqueness” are its severity (“a 
particularly severe ‘penalty’”), and its certainty (“nearly an automatic result”).  
As to severity, the Court recalled recognizing in INS v. St. Cyr that 
“[p]reserving the client’s right to remain in the United States may be more 
important to the client than any potential jail sentence.”87  As to certainty, the 
Court described how, over the previous twenty years, Congress had eliminated 
all features of the law that allowed a non-citizen defendant to avoid this result: 
  These changes to our immigration law have dramatically raised the stakes 
of a noncitizen’s criminal conviction.  The importance of accurate legal advice 
for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more important.  These 
changes confirm our view that, as a matter of federal law, deportation is an 
 
 82. Id. at 1487. 
 83. Id. at 1485 (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 486 (2000)).  For a 
discussion of how Padilla affects the application of Strickland’s prejudice prong, see Jenny 
Roberts, Proving Prejudice, Post-Padilla, 54 HOW. L.J. 693, 712–719 (2011).  See also United 
States v. Orocio,  645 F.3d 630, 643–44 (3d Cir.  2011) (overruling, in light of Padilla, circuit 
precedent requiring that defendant affirmatively show that he would have been acquitted at trial 
in order to establish prejudice). 
 84. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481. 
 85. Id. (“Whether that distinction is appropriate is a question we need not consider in this 
case because of the unique nature of deportation.”). 
 86. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 87. Id. at 1483 (quoting 533 U.S. 289, 322 (2001)). 
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integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that 
may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified 
crimes.88 
The Court noted that deportation is “intimately related to the criminal 
process,” and that “[o]ur law has enmeshed criminal convictions and the 
penalty of deportation for nearly a century.”89  However, “intimate 
relationship” may simply be another way of stating the “certainty” test.  More 
importantly, it is not clear why a penalty’s ancient lineage should figure in the 
Sixth Amendment analysis, except perhaps as a reason that lawyers should be 
responsible for knowing about it.  That said, the lineage of many present-day 
collateral sanctions can be traced to penalties of forfeiture and banishment that 
originated in Roman times,90 or registration requirements developed in the 
nineteenth century.91 
The concurring and dissenting Justices were not persuaded by the 
majority’s description of deportation as “unique,” and thought it would be hard 
to limit the holding.  Justice Alito, concurring for himself and the Chief 
Justice, grudgingly recognized a lawyer’s duty to warn the client that a guilty 
plea “may have adverse immigration consequences,” but worried that this 
obligation might apply to “a wide variety of consequences other than 
conviction and sentencing” about which criminal defense lawyers have little or 
no expertise.92  Justice Scalia, dissenting, thought that any constitutional duty 
 
 88. Id. at 1480 (footnote omitted). 
 89. Id. at 1481; see also id. at 1482 (“Deportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction 
is, because of its close connection to the criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a 
direct or a collateral consequence.”). 
 90. See Mirjan R. Damaska, Adverse Legal Consequences of Conviction and their Removal: 
A Comparative Study, 59 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 347, 350–51 (1968) (tracing 
the history of the idea that criminals should be separated from the rest of society and deprived of 
both property and protection). 
 91. See WAYNE A. LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER: CRIMINAL REGISTRATION AND 
COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAWS IN AMERICA 2, 5–9 (2009) (tracing historical antecedents of 
modern American criminal registration laws to thirteenth century efforts to apprehend wanted 
outlaws, and more systemic nineteenth century European efforts to “hold repeat offenders to 
account”). 
 92. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487, 1488 (Alito, J., concurring). 
This case happens to involve removal, but criminal convictions can carry a wide variety 
of consequences other than conviction and sentencing, including civil commitment, civil 
forfeiture, the loss of the right to vote, disqualification from public benefits, ineligibility 
to possess firearms, dishonorable discharge from the Armed Forces, and loss of business 
or professional licenses.  A criminal conviction may also severely damage a defendant’s 
reputation and thus impair the defendant’s ability to obtain future employment or business 
opportunities.  All of those consequences are “seriou[s],” but this Court has never held 
that a criminal defense attorney’s Sixth Amendment duties extend to providing advice 
about such matters. 
Id. at 1488 (citations omitted). 
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to advise must be the court’s, not counsel’s,93 and warned that the Court’s 
holding “cannot be limited to [deportation] consequences except by judicial 
caprice.”94 
C. Padilla’s Scope: Early Returns from the Lower Courts 
Cases decided since Padilla involving status-generated consequences other 
than deportation suggest that the neat formalistic dichotomy between direct 
and collateral consequences is unlikely to survive very long, at least where 
counsel’s Sixth Amendment obligations are concerned.  In particular, the 
Padilla majority’s effort to confine its holding to the “unique” consequence of 
deportation has proved no more convincing to the lower courts than it was to 
the concurring and dissenting Justices. 
What is becoming clear is that “severity” and “certainty” are qualities 
shared by a great many consequences in contemporary codes.  While it is less 
clear if a lawyer could be expected to know about all such consequences under 
“prevailing professional norms,” several courts have relied upon Padilla’s 
reasoning to extend a lawyer’s advisement obligation to sex offender 
registration.  Thus, in People v. Fonville, the Michigan Court of Appeals found 
a “significant parallel” between sex offender registration and deportation, 
relying on the Padilla Court’s reasoning to hold that a defendant charged with 
child enticement was entitled to be warned by his lawyer that a guilty plea 
would require him to register.95  Derek Fonville was criminally charged after 
he kept his girlfriend’s two young children, who he was babysitting, longer 
than agreed.96  Fonville and a friend had driven around all night looking for 
drugs with the children in the back seat of their car and were apprehended the 
next day by police.97  Based on his established relationship with the children 
and the fact that they were unharmed, the kidnapping charges against him were 
dropped and he was allowed to plead to child enticement.98  He later 
challenged his conviction arguing, inter alia, that he had not been warned by 
his lawyer that this charge could require him to register as a sex offender.99  
The Court of Appeals agreed: 
  We recognize a significant parallel to be drawn from the Supreme Court’s 
rationale in Padilla to the circumstances of this case.  Similar to the risk of 
 
 93. Id. at 1496 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he effect of misadvice regarding such 
consequences upon the validity of a guilty plea should be analyzed under the Due Process 
Clause.”). 
 94. Id. at 1496. 
 95. 804 N.W.2d 878, 894–95 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011). 
 96. Id. at 881. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 882. 
 99. Id. at 882–83. 
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deportation, sex offender registration “as a consequence of a criminal 
conviction is, because of its close connection to the criminal process, . . . 
difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence[,]” and that 
therefore “[t]he collateral versus direct distinction is . . . ill-suited to evaluat[e] 
a Strickland claim” concerning the sex-offender-registration requirement. 
  Like the consequence of deportation, sex offender registration is not a 
criminal sanction, but it is a particularly severe penalty.  In addition to the 
typical stigma that convicted criminals are subject to upon release from 
imprisonment, sexual offenders are subject to unique ramifications, including, 
for example, residency-reporting requirements and place-of-domicile 
restrictions.  Moreover, sex offender registration is “intimately related to the 
criminal process.”  The “automatic result” of sex offender registration for 
certain defendants makes it difficult “to divorce the penalty from the 
conviction.”100 
Of particular interest in this case is the Fonville court’s apparent belief that 
any consequence that is the “automatic result” of conviction is ipso facto 
“intimately related to the criminal process.”101  In other words, it takes nothing 
more to establish a “close connection” to or “intimate relationship” with the 
criminal process than that the consequence be “automatic.”  The court later 
emphasized the “mandatory” nature of sex offender registration in minimizing 
concerns that its holding might “open the door for defendants to withdraw their 
pleas for other collateral reasons.”102 
[W]hile the Padilla decision has provided us with the key to open the door to 
allow defendants to withdraw their pleas for failure to be informed of the sex-
offender-registration requirement, we do not see our decision as opening the 
floodgates to withdrawal-of-plea motions for other collateral reasons.  Our 
decision is limited to distinguishing the unique and mandatory nature of the 
specific consequence of the sex-offender-registration requirement from the 
common, potential, and incidental consequences associated with criminal 
convictions.103 
Note the Fonville court’s interpretation of the term “unique” as anything other 
than a “common, potential, and incidental” consequence.  While the court 
apparently did not think it relevant to establish that the penalty of registration 
has a long historical association with the criminal process, it could easily have 
done so.104 
 
 100. Id. at 894 (footnotes omitted). 
 101. Fonville, 804 N.W.2d at 894 (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 
(2010)). 
 102. Id. at 895 (quoting People v. Davidovich,  606 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) 
(holding that no notice of deportation consequences was required)). 
 103. Id. 
 104. See LOGAN, supra note 89, at 2–48. 
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The Fonville court also held that because “the sex-offender-registration 
statute is ‘succinct, clear, and explicit’ in defining the registration requirement 
for [defendant’s] conviction of child enticement,” counsel “owed a duty to 
clearly advise [defendant] that his plea to the charge of child enticement would 
require that he register as a sex offender.”105  However, as in Padilla, the 
relative clarity of the registration statute meant that counsel must “clearly 
advise” the defendant.106  Absent such clarity, counsel’s duty can be satisfied 
by a more general warning, but in no case can a lawyer neglect entirely to 
mention such a severe and mandatory consequence.107  In support of its 
decision, the Fonville court cited a Georgia Court of Appeals case that had 
reached the same conclusion about sex offender registration, also in reliance on 
Padilla.108  Courts from other states have reached the same conclusion.109 
A few stray swallows do not make a summer.  Sex offender registration 
and other incidents of a sex offense sentence (e.g., lifetime supervision, 
residency requirements) are arguably as “intimately related” to the court-
imposed sentence as consequences like parole eligibility that were held to be 
“direct” under pre-Padilla caselaw.110  Presumably, consequences so closely 
linked to the offense of conviction and to the court-imposed sentence are ones 
a competent lawyer could be expected to know.  But even here, the courts are 
showing some reluctance to let go of the collateral consequences doctrine and 
its apparently discredited misadvice exception.  Thus, in a post-Padilla 
decision, the Missouri Supreme Court described parole eligibility as a 
“collateral” consequence and vacated the conviction only because the lawyer’s 
advice about it was incorrect.111  Concurring in the judgment, Chief Justice 
Michael Wolff pointed out that Padilla would seem to require accurate advice 
about any consequence as clear and certain as parole eligibility, as well as 
many other status-generated consequences.112 
 
 105. Fonville, 804 N.W.2d at 895–96 (quoting Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 894–95. 
 108. Id. (citing Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384, 388 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that the 
failure of trial counsel to advise his client that his guilty plea to child molestation would require 
that he register constituted deficient performance)). 
 109. See In re C.P.H., No. FJ-03-1313-02, 2010 WL 2926541, at *7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. July 23, 2010) (holding failure to advise juvenile of lifetime sex offender registration 
constituted ineffective assistance).  See also the pre-Padilla decision of the New Mexico state 
court in State v. Edwards, 157 P.3d 56, 64–65 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007), holding ineffective 
assistance in failure to advise about sex offender registration. 
 110. See supra note 50. 
 111. Webb v. State, 334 S.W.3d 126, 129 (Mo. 2011) (en banc) (citing Reynolds v. State, 994 
S.W.2d 944, 946 (Mo. 1999) (en banc)). 
 112. Id. at 138 (Wolff, C.J., concurring). 
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Since Padilla, several courts have held that civil commitment is not a 
candidate for inclusion on the “must warn” list of consequences.113  This seems 
consistent with Padilla’s “severe and certain” test.  While civil commitment is 
indisputably severe, it is not “automatic” or “mandatory” in the same way that 
deportation and sex offender registration are, but depends upon an additional 
administrative determination following conviction.  All the same, the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals cited Padilla in support of its holding that a defendant 
was entitled to vacatur when he was incorrectly advised about the possibility of 
civil commitment.114  And the Iowa Court of Appeals recently suggested that 
Padilla might require an affirmative counsel warning about civil 
commitment.115 
The results where other collateral consequences are concerned have been 
mixed.  For example, the Alaska Court of Appeals held, relying on Padilla, 
that a lawyer should have advised his client that pleading nolo contendere to 
assault would estop him from contesting the facts in a subsequent civil suit for 
damages by the victim.116  However, the Minnesota Court of Appeals was not 
so sympathetic to a defendant who claimed that his sexual assault conviction 
would cost him his job as an over-the-road trucker because he would have to 
“register as a sex offender in all 48 states.”117 
In summary, despite the Padilla Court’s effort to cabin its holding by 
describing deportation as “unique,” courts are beginning to rely on its logic to 
extend counsel’s advisory obligations to other certain consequences that they 
 
 113. See Brown v. Goodwin, No. 09-211 (RMB), 2010 WL 1930574, at *13 (D.N.J. May 11, 
2010) (declining to apply Padilla to a claim that counsel failed to inform the defendant that his 
guilty plea would place him at risk of civil commitment as a sexually violent predator); Maxwell 
v. Larkins, No. 4:08 CV 1896 DDN, 2010 WL 2680333, at *9–10 (E.D. Mo. July 1, 2010) 
(declining to expand Padilla to find defense counsel ineffective for failing to advise the defendant 
of the possibility of commitment as a sexually violent predator, sex offender registry, or 
completion of the sex offender treatment program). 
 114. Bauder v. Dep’t of Corr., 619 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 115. Blaise v. State, No. 10-0466, 2011 WL 2078091, at *3–4 (Iowa Ct. App. May 25, 2011).  
The defendant urged the court to vacate his conviction on grounds that commitment as a sexually 
violent predator was a “direct” consequence of his conviction.  Id. at *4 n.6.  The court rejected 
this argument because commitment is not a “definite, immediate, or automatic” result of 
conviction for first-degree harassment, relying on pre-Padilla case law.  Id.  The court noted, 
however, that “our conclusion might be different were the Supreme Court’s analysis in Padilla 
applied.”  Id. 
 116. Wilson v. State, 244 P.3d 535, 536, 539 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010) (finding ineffective 
assistance where defendant misadvised about effect of nolo contendere plea on civil liability).  
Contra United States v. Bakilana, No. 1:10-cr-00093 (LMB), 2010 WL 4007608, at *2–3 (E.D. 
Va. Oct. 12, 2010). 
 117. State v. Elmblad, A10-444, 2011 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11, at *3–5 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Jan. 4, 2011).  In affirming the lower court’s denial of relief, the Court of Appeals pointed 
out that Elmblad knew of the registration requirement and could always get a job driving within 
the state.  Id. at *5–7. 
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would characterize as “collateral” where their own advisory obligations are 
concerned, such as sex offender registration and civil commitment.  It seems 
that it is enough to trigger counsel’s advisory obligation that the consequence 
is an “automatic result” of conviction so that it is impossible “to divorce the 
penalty from the conviction”118 (“intimately related to the criminal process”119 
appears to mean no more than that), and that it is severe enough to potentially 
affect the defendant’s willingness to accept a particular plea offer.  To the 
extent a penalty’s historical association with the criminal process figures into 
the Sixth Amendment analysis, in many cases (as with registration and 
forfeiture penalties) this can easily be established.120 
At the same time, courts have for the most part resisted Padilla’s influence 
where their own due process obligations are concerned, clinging to the 
collateral consequences doctrine to distinguish what they must advise about 
and what they need not mention.  This seems appropriate, if only because of 
institutional limits on what a court may be expected to know about what is 
important to a particular defendant.  For example, the Supreme Court of 
Georgia rejected a due process challenge to a plea based on the court’s failure 
to notify the defendant about the possibility of deportation, noting that: 
[Padilla] clarifies that defense counsel may be ineffective in relation to a guilty 
plea due to professional duties for the representation of their individual clients 
that set a standard different—and higher—than those traditionally imposed on 
trial courts conducting plea hearings for defendants about whom the judges 
often know very little.  This makes both analytical and practical sense.121 
The Supreme Court of Tennessee did not even cite Padilla in holding that the 
trial court was not required to notify a defendant about sex offender 
registration, though it held that lifetime supervision was sufficiently close to 
the court-imposed sentence to be regarded as “direct.”122 
Even if Padilla does not directly implicate a court’s due process 
obligation, its concern about excessively punitive collateral consequences 
reverberated in two recent due process decisions of the New York Court of 
Appeals.  In People v. Gravino, a closely divided court rejected a claim that the 
plea court should have notified one defendant about sex offender registration 
requirements and another defendant about conditions of probation limiting his 
 
 118. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2011). 
 119. Id. 
 120. See supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text. 
 121. Smith v. State, 697 S.E.2d 177, 183–84 (Ga. 2010). 
 122. Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461, 464 (Tenn. 2010).  Prior to Padilla, other courts had 
held that mandatory supervision was a direct consequence about which a court must notify a 
defendant.  See, e.g., People v. Catu, 825 N.E.2d 1081, 1082 (N.Y. 2005);  Palmer v. State, 59 
P.3d 1192, 1196–97 (Nev. 2002); State v. Jamgochian, 832 A.2d 360, 362 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2003). 
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contact with his own young children, because these were not deemed “direct” 
consequences of their pleas.123  Noting that Padilla had rejected the 
direct/collateral distinction for Sixth Amendment purposes, the majority noted 
“[t]here may be cases in which a defendant can show that he pleaded guilty in 
ignorance of a consequence that, although collateral for purposes of due 
process, was of such great importance to him that he would have made a 
different decision had that consequence been disclosed.”124  The dissent, joined 
by Chief Judge Lippman, urged that mandatory registration must be regarded 
as a direct consequence of the plea under the court’s precedents, and that “the 
rationale employed by the [Supreme Court in Padilla] in rejecting the 
direct/collateral consequences dichotomy applies with equal force . . . where 
the court has failed to advise the defendant of SORA registration, which is also 
a civil penalty ‘difficult to divorce . . . from [a] conviction.’”125  Several 
months later, the New York court extended its holding in Gravino to a failure 
to warn about the potential for civil commitment.126  This time Chief Judge 
Lippman did not join the dissent, perhaps because civil commitment is not so 
closely tied to the court-imposed sentence as registration and terms of 
probation, and not so certain.127 
These two New York cases suggest that severe consequences that are 
automatically triggered for any person convicted of a particular crime may be 
held to be “direct” and thus within a court’s obligation to notify, in contrast to 
consequences like deportation that are “peculiar to the individual’s personal 
circumstances” or “result from the actions taken by agencies the court does not 
control.”128  It should not be necessary to characterize a particular consequence 
as constitutional “punishment” in order to conclude that a defendant should be 
entitled to notice from the court as a matter of due process.  But the Sixth 
Amendment sets a higher standard of advisement, since a defense lawyer 
should know what specific consequences of conviction are so important to the 
client, and so difficult to mitigate after the fact, that they will affect the client’s 
 
 123. 928 N.E.2d 1048, 1053–56 (N.Y. 2010). 
 124. Id. at 1056. 
 125. Id. at 1058 n.1 (Ciparick, J., dissenting) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 
1481 (2010)). 
 126. See People v. Harnett, 945 N.E.2d 439, 443 (N.Y. 2011). 
 127. Cf. State v. Bellamy, 835 A.2d 1231, 1238–39 (N.J. 2003) (finding civil commitment 
neither direct nor collateral, but fundamental fairness requires that a trial court, prior to accepting 
a plea to a predicate offense under the SVPA, must ensure that the defendant understands that 
there is a possibility of future commitment, and that the commitment may be for an indefinite 
period of time, up to and including lifetime commitment). 
 128. Gravino, 928 N.E.2d at 1052 (citing People v. Ford, 657 N.E.2d 265, 268 (N.Y. 1995)). 
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bargaining calculus.  The different advisement obligations of court and counsel 
are attributable, as they should be, to their different institutional competence.129 
D. The New Test of Lawyer Competence Applied to Commonwealth v. 
Abraham 
The foregoing analysis of the Padilla decision and its progeny to date 
suggests that the direct/collateral distinction has outlived its usefulness, at least 
for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.  The questions posed by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in granting review in Abraham suggest an 
interest in putting the appellate court’s holding on a firmer doctrinal footing 
than the one on which that court relied.  After Padilla, it should no longer be 
necessary to find a particular consequence to be “punitive” (as the court of 
appeals did in Abraham)130 to find that notice is constitutionally required.  
Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may be prepared to reject the 
collateral/direct distinction for pension forfeiture for the same reasons the 
Fonville court rejected it for sex offender registration, and to add yet another 
consequence to the growing list of “unique” consequences that courts have 
held to be covered by the Padilla holding. 
This seems to be the correct approach.  Padilla teaches that competent 
counsel must warn a client considering a guilty plea about consequences of 
conviction that are severe and certain, and of predictable importance to the 
client, whether they arise from statute, regulation, or contract.  The Sixth 
Amendment requires this warning without regard to whether the particular 
consequence amounts to punishment for purposes of other provisions of the 
Constitution.  Fonville and other cases requiring notice of sex offender 
registration underscore this point, since the Supreme Court has specifically 
held that sex offender registration requirements may be imposed without 
regard to the Ex Post Facto Clause.131  In a word, the court of appeals in 
Abraham did not need to conclude that the pension forfeiture at issue there was 
“punitive” in order to find that it was within counsel’s obligation to notify his 
client about it. 
 
 129. See Chin & Holmes, supra note 9, at 727.  See generally Danielle M. Lang, Note, Padilla 
v. Kentucky: The Effect of Plea Colloquy Warnings on Defendants’ Ability to Bring Successful 
Padilla Claims, 121 YALE L.J. 944 (2012) (arguing that plea colloquy warnings do not serve the 
same function as advice from counsel in protecting non-citizen defendants’ rights, and criticizing 
cases holding that such warnings may negate findings of prejudice in Sixth Amendment Padilla 
claims). 
 130. 996 A.2d 1090, 1095 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010). 
 131. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 96, 99 (2003) (requiring convicted sex offenders to 
register with state was not ex post facto law since statute was intended as non-punitive civil 
means of protecting the public, and adverse effects to offenders did not render statute effectively 
punitive). 
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There is an additional reason why the reasoning of the court of appeals in 
Abraham should be rejected: If pension forfeiture is constitutional punishment, 
then the court would also have had an obligation to notify Abraham about it 
before accepting his plea, as a matter of due process.132  But the constitutional 
advisement obligations of court and counsel are almost certainly not the 
same,133  and nothing in the Padilla opinion suggests that they are: A court 
should have no occasion to make its own inquiry into the immigration status of 
a particular defendant, and this might even be considered inappropriate.134  The 
Abraham case illustrates nicely the distinction between the advisory 
obligations of court and counsel, since the court would have had no more 
reason to inquire into Joseph Abraham’s means of support than the Kentucky 
trial court had to inquire into Jose Padilla’s immigration status.  At most, the 
court might have satisfied itself that the offenses to which both men pled did 
not carry with them some mandatory requirement of registration or supervision 
under state or federal law.  Finding no such requirement, or a similar one 
within its own institutional competence, the court could not be expected to do 
more. 
Applying the principles and logic of Padilla to the facts of Joseph 
Abraham’s case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court should hold that the 
direct/collateral distinction is no longer relevant for determining counsel’s 
Sixth Amendment advisement obligation in connection with a plea.  It should 
hold further that it was not necessary to find that the pension forfeiture was 
“punitive” in order to conclude that Abraham’s lawyer should have warned 
him about it.  Rather, all that was required was a finding that the consequence 
was severe and certain, and one that Abraham’s lawyer knew or should have 
known would have great importance to his client in deciding whether to accept 
the government’s plea offer.  The lawyer knew that Abraham was drawing a 
pension from his service as a public school teacher, and he should have done 
the necessary investigation to determine whether any of the charges Abraham 
was facing would have an adverse effect on his client’s primary source of 
income.  If more were thought necessary, the court could note that forfeiture of 
property is a penalty triggered by criminal conviction that is at least as old as 
banishment.135 
While the forfeiture penalty in this case seems disproportionately severe 
and therefore surprising in light of the relatively minor nature of the crime, the 
 
 132. See cases cited supra note 122. 
 133. Cf.  Calvert v. State, 342 S.W.3d 477, 490 (Tenn. 2011) (holding that counsel has same 
duty as court to notify defendant about consequence of lifetime supervision). 
 134. See generally Smith v. State, 697 S.E.2d 177, 184–85, 188 (Ga. 2011) (holding that 
Padilla did not require court to notify defendant of immigration consequences; claim based upon 
counsel’s failure to provide such notice could be raised in collateral proceedings). 
 135. See Damaska, supra note 90, at 351. 
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law was plain that even conviction of a misdemeanor would result in pension 
forfeiture.  As the Court stated in Padilla, if a consequence is “truly clear,” as 
it was in Mr. Abraham’s case, “the duty to give correct advice is equally 
clear.”136  Even if the pension forfeiture law were thought to be something less 
than “succinct and straightforward,” Abraham’s attorney should at least have 
warned his client that the charges against him “may carry a risk of adverse 
[pension] consequences.”137 
The only issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is whether the 
lawyer’s performance was “reasonable” under “prevailing professional 
norms.”138  It will be up to the post-conviction court, on remand, to decide 
whether Abraham was prejudiced by his lawyer’s failure to advise him about 
the prospective loss of his pension.  That inquiry will entail a determination 
whether Abraham, with appropriate knowledge, would have made a different 
choice about accepting the state’s plea offer.139  If the court finds that he would 
have, then Abraham should be entitled to withdraw his plea. 
III.  COMPLETING PADILLA’S UNFINISHED BUSINESS 
The extraordinary growth of severe and certain collateral penalties in the 
past two decades threatens to destabilize the guilty plea system on which the 
criminal justice system has come to depend.  Well-counseled defendants will 
be more reluctant to plead guilty if those penalties are too severe and if there is 
no readily available way to avoid or mitigate them.  Courts and prosecutors 
alike have an interest in not “gumming up the plea-bargaining assembly 
line.”140  To this end, Professor Bibas has proposed a series of non-
constitutional procedural reforms drawn from consumer protection law that are 
designed to ensure that defendants understand and consider carefully the most 
important terms of their bargains, such as written offers in terms 
comprehensible to lay persons, clear standardized disclosures by prosecutors, 
and cooling-off periods to moderate the pressure to enter an early plea.141  This 
section proposes substantive ways in which the regime of collateral penalties 
can be limited, by giving defense lawyers new negotiating tools to avoid the 
 
 136. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 1482 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). 
 139. See id. at 1485 (“[A] petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea 
bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.”); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58–9 
(holding that the prejudice inquiry “focuses on whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective 
performance affected the outcome of the plea process”).  See generally Roberts, supra note 83, at 
712–19 (arguing that Padilla marks a rejection of a trial-outcome test of prejudice for ineffective 
assistance in the plea process). 
 140. See Bibas, supra note 4, at 1159. 
 141. Id. at 1153–59. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
114 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXI:87 
application of particular consequences, and by enabling defendants to mitigate 
those that cannot be avoided. 
A. Padilla’s Practical Challenge to Defense Lawyers 
As the preceding section suggests, the distinction between direct and 
collateral consequences that has informed the advisement duties of both court 
and counsel in the plea context is unlikely to survive the Padilla decision, at 
least where counsel’s duties are concerned.  If a particular consequence of 
conviction will have such a severe impact on the client that it will influence the 
client’s decision to plead, and if that consequence will be triggered 
automatically by the particular crime to which the defendant is proposing to 
plead, a competent lawyer must inform the client about it.  As Professor Bibas 
has argued,”[t]he Sixth Amendment test should be not whether a consequence 
is labeled civil or collateral, but whether it is severe enough and certain enough 
to be a significant factor in criminal defendants’ bargaining calculus.”142  A 
competent lawyer should be required to advise (or at least warn) the client 
about any consequence that could dissuade him from agreeing to the 
prosecutor’s offer.143  Certainly the pension forfeiture that accompanied Joseph 
Abraham’s indecent assault conviction falls into this category. 
The conventional wisdom about the nature of a defense lawyer’s role 
might excuse Abraham’s lawyer’s performance.  How could he have been 
expected to know about the pension forfeiture?  After all, there was no list of 
the hundreds of applicable statutory or regulatory penalties arising under state 
and federal law to which he could refer.144  Like many defense lawyers, 
 
 142. Id. at 1147; see also The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Leading Cases, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 179, 199 (2010) (“The Court implicitly rejected the current approaches to determining 
Strickland’s reach and created a new category of covered topics that cannot reasonably be 
restricted to the deportation consequence alone.”); Chin & Love, supra note 7, at 24 (noting that 
many other consequences “follow automatically from conviction and [are] thus tied directly to the 
criminal case, they are important to the individuals involved, and they may therefore drive plea 
bargains”). 
 143. If a lawyer fails in his duty to warn, a court will then be required to determine whether a 
defendant was prejudiced by his counsel’s default: that is, whether there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would have rejected the plea bargain.  See generally 
Roberts, supra note 83.  The contours of the prejudice test in the plea bargaining context may be 
further elucidated by the Court in two cases to be argued in the 2011 Term.  Missouri v. Frye, 131 
S. Ct. 856 (2011); Lafler v. Cooper, 131 S. Ct. 856 (2011).  Both of these cases involve 
ineffective assistance claims arising from a client’s failure to accept a plea offer because of 
deficient advice from his lawyer, but the test of prejudice under Strickland should be the same: 
But for counsel’s incompetence, would the client have rejected (or accepted) the government’s 
offer.  Frye v. State, 311 S.W.3d 350, 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010); Cooper v. Lafler, 376 F. App’x 
563, 569 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 144. See  ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY Standard 14-3.2(f) 
(3d. ed. 1999) (“To the extent possible, defense counsel should determine and advise the 
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whether private practitioner or public defender, his job was to get his client out 
of a jam as efficiently as possible so he could “get on with his life.”145  The 
prosecutor was willing to offer a quick plea to a misdemeanor that didn’t even 
require registration as a sex offender, so his client could go home.  How could 
he have reasonably been expected to do more?  Abraham was charged with 
misdemeanors, which generally don’t pack the civil wallop of a felony.146  
How could he or his lawyer have anticipated this draconian additional penalty?  
Would the result have been any different if Abraham had been a nursing 
student charged with drug possession147 or a Navy Seal charged with assaulting 
his girlfriend?148 
It is a commonplace that most busy defense lawyers cannot be expected to 
do the kind of research necessary to unearth and analyze all of the disparate 
statutory and regulatory consequences in state and federal law, or under private 
contract, that might conceivably place too high a price on a client’s giving up 
the right to go to trial.149  The system depends upon stable guilty pleas, and the 
“prevailing professional norms” that establish competence for Sixth 
Amendment purposes must “take seriously such considerations as cost and 
efficiency.”150  Any additional burden on counsel in high-volume misdemeanor 
courts would be particularly problematic.151  But Padilla has made this narrow 
guilt-centered approach to a defense lawyer’s obligations untenable, putting 
the weight of the Sixth Amendment behind a broader “holistic” concept of a 
criminal defense lawyer’s responsibility to the client.  The holistic approach 
 
defendant, sufficiently in advance of the entry of any plea, as to the possible collateral 
consequences that might ensue from entry of the contemplated plea.”). 
 145. See Interview with William Stickman, supra note 23. 
 146. But see Roberts, supra note 13 (manuscript at 13–17) (describing a variety of 
consequences, including deportation, sex offender registration, and eviction that may result from 
a misdemeanor conviction). 
 147. See, e.g., 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 216(c) (West 2002) (no person may be licensed as 
a registered nurse in Pennsylvania until ten years after conviction of a drug felony).  Many states 
absolutely bar licensure as a nurse by anyone convicted of a drug felony. 
 148. Misdemeanor domestic violence convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2006) are not 
within the exception in 18 U.S.C. § 925 that permits convicted persons otherwise subject to 
federal firearms disability to use firearms in the service of the United States or any of its agencies. 
 149. See Daryll Brown, Why Padilla Doesn’t Matter (Much), 58 UCLA L. REV. 1393, 1396–
97 (2011) (“[T]he conditions of indigent defense provision . . . restrict attorneys’ capacity to 
creatively negotiate please for their clients and perhaps to maintain more than a limited, general 
awareness of immigration law.”). 
 150. Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and Collateral 
Consequences at Guilty Plea, 54 HOW. L. REV. 675, 680 (2011); see also id. at 678 (“It is 
pointless to impose a duty on defense counsel that cannot be satisfied, either because it expects 
herculean research efforts, or because it will accept superficial advice based on moderate 
research.”). 
 151. See generally Roberts, supra note 13 (describing the lower courts’ dependence on pleas 
at arraignment). 
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would insist that defense lawyers take the time to understand the full effect of 
conviction on a client’s professional and personal circumstances, whether it be 
loss of a job or eviction from housing, and craft an advocacy strategy based on 
this information.152  The biggest challenge over the next decade will be to 
reconcile this new standard of competent defense with the reality that it may be 
hard in the beginning for most defense lawyers to meet it.153 
One answer lies in making it easier.  The system as a whole has a stake in 
providing defense counsel with the tools they need to determine what collateral 
penalties may derail a plea negotiation so that adequate warnings may be 
given.  This should include putting data about these penalties in usable form 
and updating it on a regular basis.154  Even before Padilla, jurisdictions had 
been working to collect information about statutory and regulatory penalties, 
and now the federal government is funding a comprehensive national 
survey.155  The expanded duty of counsel will affect the way defense services 
are delivered156 and the way other actors in the justice system behave.157  
While courts may continue to employ a distinction between direct and 
collateral consequences where their own duty of advisement is concerned, and 
while prosecutors  have no constitutional obligation to know about collateral 
 
 152. See, e.g., McGregor Smyth, Holistic is Not a Bad Word: A Criminal Defense Attorney’s 
Guide to Using Invisible Punishments as an Advocacy Strategy, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 479, 480–87 
(2005) (arguing that advocacy in the criminal case can mitigate collateral damage of criminal 
proceedings such as eviction or job loss). 
 153. See generally, Margaret Colgate Love, Evolving Standards of Reasonableness: The ABA 
Standards and the Right to Counsel in Plea Negotiations, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming 
2012) (arguing that because the constitutional test under the Sixth Amendment is necessarily an 
evolving one, the defense bar has a stake in participating in the process by which professional 
standards are established). 
 154. Chin argues that a logical place to repose this responsibility is a state sentencing 
commission or a legislative office charged with drafting and cataloguing statutes.  Chin, supra 
note 150, at 686–87. 
 155. In April 2011, the Attorney General of the United States wrote to the attorneys general 
of all fifty states informing them of this compilation project, being conducted by the American 
Bar Association, and encouraging them “to evaluate the collateral consequences in your state—
and to determine whether those that impose burdens on individuals convicted of crimes without 
increasing public safety should be eliminated.”  Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., to Attorneys 
General supra note 7, at 2.  The letter indicated that the Justice Department “intend[s] to conduct 
a similar review of federal collateral consequences identified in the American Bar Association 
study.”  Id. 
 156. See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright, Padilla and the Delivery of Integrated Criminal Defense, 58 
UCLA L. REV. 1515, 1518–19 (2011) (“Padilla reinforces long-term trends in criminal defense.  
It tilts the field towards larger defender organizations with greater specialization of function and 
more coordination of effort among attorneys—in short, toward a more bureaucratic criminal 
defense.”). 
 157. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 13 (manuscript at 36–54) (proposing a role for legislatures 
in decriminalizing relatively harmless behavior and for courts in developing a misdemeanor 
ineffective assistance jurisprudence). 
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penalties at all, both courts and prosecutors must  be concerned that defense 
lawyers are able to do a competent job, lest the plea process itself be 
undermined.158 
B. Three Reforms from the ABA Standards to Stabilize the Plea System and 
Make a Defender’s Job Easier 
Padilla can thus best be understood as a constitutional prompt to address, 
through non-constitutional means, what has become a vexing social problem.  
The preceding section suggests that defense lawyers will bear the brunt of 
making Padilla’s promise a reality.  The ABA Criminal Justice Standards offer 
a comprehensive framework for making a defender’s life easier.  The 
Standards, the product of a project begun in 1964 by then-ABA President (and 
later Justice) Lewis F. Powell, Jr., “represent the considered consensus views 
of prosecutors, defenders, and judges, and constitute a realistic and balanced 
approach to criminal justice that has proven effective over time.”159  In the 
Sixth Amendment context, these Standards have been recognized by the 
Supreme Court, most recently in Padilla itself, as “valuable measures of the 
prevailing professional norms of effective representation” for Sixth 
Amendment purposes.160 
The volume of the Standards dealing specifically with collateral 
consequences, the Standards on Collateral Sanctions and Discretionary 
 
 158. See Robert Pratt, The Implications of Padilla v. Kentucky on Practice in United States 
District Courts, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 169, 176 (2011) (“[An] important factor judges  
must consider in determining whether to accept or reject a defendant’s guilty plea is whether 
defense counsel has adequately fulfilled his duties in advising the defendant.”); STEVEN WELLER 
ET AL., CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY STUDIES, A BENCH GUIDE FOR STATE TRIAL COURT JUDGES ON 
IMMIGRATION ISSUES IN JUVENILE AND FAMILY CASES (2010), available at http://www.centerfor 
publicpolicy.org/index.php?s=57; Catherine A. Christian, Collateral Consequences: Role of the 
Prosecutor, 54 HOW. L.J. 749, 750 (2011) (“[A] just and fair prosecutor will consider the 
collateral consequences that may apply in a particular case and take them into account when 
considering a disposition.”); Robert M.A. Johnson, Collateral Consequences, PROSECUTOR, 
May/June 2001, at 5 (“[Prosecutors] must consider [collateral consequences] if we are to see that 
justice is done.”); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY Standard 
14-1.4(d) (3d. ed. 1999) (“[T]he court should not accept the plea where it appears the defendant 
has not had the effective assistance of counsel.”); UNIF. R. CRIM. P. 444(b)(2) (1987) (“[T]he 
court . . . may not accept the plea if it appears that the defendant has not had the effective 
assistance of counsel.”). 
 159. See Brief of the Am. Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 
65, at 3. 
 160. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010) (citing ABA STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-5.1(a) (3d. 
ed. 1993); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY Standard 14-3.2(f)); see 
also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (“Prevailing norms of practice as 
reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like are guides to determining what 
[performance of counsel] is reasonable.” (citation omitted)). 
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Disqualification,161 presciently anticipated some of the reforms that will be 
required to complete the Padilla project.  These Standards, supplemented by 
other volumes of the Standards, offer three specific ways that jurisdictions can 
limit the disruptive and destabilizing effect of collateral penalties on the plea 
negotiation process: 
1. Ensure that defenders have the necessary information to advise clients 
about the consequences of conviction that are imposed by operation of 
law as opposed to the sentencing court (“collateral sanctions”)162 and 
engage the court in the advisement process; and 
2. Limit collateral sanctions to those that can be justified as necessary and 
appropriate for any person convicted of a particular offense; 
3. Provide a timely and effective way to avoid or mitigate any applicable 
collateral sanctions. 
1. Information about Collateral Sanctions 
The first reform to complete the Padilla project is to give all actors in the 
system the information they need to understand the range of automatic 
statutory or regulatory penalties that apply to conviction of particular crimes, 
under the law of the state where the prosecution is pending and under federal 
law.  The Collateral Sanctions Standards require that jurisdictions should 
“collect, set out or reference all collateral sanctions in a single chapter of the 
jurisdiction’s criminal code.”163  The availability of a full collection of 
collateral sanctions will make it more practicable for defense counsel to 
 
 161. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND 
DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS (3d. ed. 2004). 
 162. The Collateral Sanctions Standards define the term “collateral sanction” as a penalty or 
disability “that is imposed on a person automatically upon that person’s conviction for a felony, 
misdemeanor or other offense, even if it is not included in the sentence.”  ABA STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF 
CONVICTED PERSONS Standard 19-1.1(a).  It is contrasted with a “discretionary disqualification,” 
which is defined as a penalty or disability that a civil court or agency “is authorized but not 
required to impose on a person convicted of an offense on grounds related to the conviction.”  Id. 
Standard 19-1.1(b).  For purposes of this Article, the term “collateral sanction” is used 
interchangeably with “automatic penalty.” 
 163. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND 
DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS Standard 19-2.1.  The commentary 
to Standard 19-2.1 notes that the “current difficulty in locating all of the widely dispersed statutes 
imposing collateral sanctions undermines the fundamental purpose of notice and fairness behind 
criminal codes.”  ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND 
DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS Standard 19-1.1(a) cmt.  In 
addition, “[a]n offender’s failure to appreciate the changes in the legal situation resulting from 
conviction may have far-reaching consequences for the offender’s ability to comply with the 
law.”  Id. 
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discharge their duty of advisement.164  It will facilitate the ability of the court 
to ensure that defendants have been adequately advised,165 and make it 
possible for the government to reassure the public that a case has been dealt 
 
 164. As previously noted, the Pleas of Guilty Standard 14-3.2(f) qualifies counsel’s 
advisement duties under the Standards with the phrase “[t]o the extent possible.” ABA 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY Standard 14-3.2(f).  The commentary to 
Collateral Sanctions Standard 19-2.3 provides that “[c]ollection of applicable collateral sanctions 
pursuant to Standard 19-2.1 will make it possible for lawyers to give full advice in all cases.  
Thus, the contingency in Standard 14-3.2(f) that qualifies defense counsel’s duty would no longer 
pertain.” ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND 
DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS Standard 19-2.3 cmt.  The 
inventory required by Standard 19-2.1 will be confined to statutory and regulatory consequences, 
so that defense counsel must question a client closely about sanctions that may be imposed by 
private contract.  For example, a private school might include the same sort of pension forfeiture 
provision in its employment contracts as applied to Joseph Abraham by operation of 
Pennsylvania law. 
 165. The Collateral Sanctions Standards provide: 
The rules of procedure should require a court to ensure, before accepting a plea of guilty, 
that the defendant has been informed of collateral sanctions made applicable to the 
offense or offenses of conviction under the law of the state or territory where the 
prosecution is pending, and under federal law.  Except where notification by the court 
itself is otherwise required by law or rules of procedure, this requirement may be satisfied 
by confirming on the record that defense counsel’s duty of advisement under Standard 14-
3.2(f) has been discharged. 
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY 
DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS Standard 19-2.3(a). 
The Pleas of Guilty Standards further provide: 
[T]he court should also advise the defendant that by entering the plea, the defendant may 
face additional consequences including but not limited to the forfeiture of property, the 
loss of certain civil rights, disqualification from certain governmental benefits, enhanced 
punishment if the defendant is convicted of another crime in the future, and, if the 
defendant is not a United States citizen, a change in the defendant’s immigration status. 
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY Standard 14-1.4(c); see also ABA 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY Standard 14-1.4(d) (“[T]he court should 
not to accept the plea where it appears the defendant has not had the effective assistance of 
counsel.”); UNIF. R. CRIM. P. 444(b)(2) (1987) (“[T]he court . . . may not accept the plea if it 
appears that the defendant has not had the effective assistance of counsel.”).  The commentary to 
Standard 19-2.3 points out that “[l]egislatures by statute or courts by rule or other law may 
choose to make notice of particular sanctions a condition of a valid plea,” and may “choose to 
make a substantial failure to comply with the duty of notification a basis for setting aside a plea.”  
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY 
DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS Standard 19-2.3 cmt.; see, e.g., Brief of the Nat’l 
Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers et al. at app. B, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 
08-651) (listing thirty states that as of June 2009 required the court to give notice of immigration 
consequences of conviction).  In August 2011, the Judicial Conference published for comment a 
proposed amendment to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requiring notice of 
immigration consequences. Federal Rules Published for Comment, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www. 
uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/PublishedRules.aspx (Aug. 2011)). 
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with in a just manner.166  If Pennsylvania’s statutes imposing collateral 
sanctions had been collected and linked to the crimes triggering them, it would 
have been relatively easy for Joseph Abraham’s counsel to check the four 
misdemeanors with which his client was charged and to adjust his negotiating 
strategy accordingly.  As the Padilla Court recognized, “[c]ounsel who possess 
the most rudimentary understanding of the [statutory] consequences of a 
particular criminal offense may be able to plea bargain creatively with the 
prosecutor in order to craft a conviction and sentence that reduce the likelihood 
of” that consequence occurring.167  The result can be a solution that “satisf[ies] 
the interests of both parties.”168  Having a compilation of collateral sanctions at 
hand would have allowed the court that accepted Abraham’s plea to make 
inquiry of his lawyer with a certain degree of confidence.  A just resolution of 
Abraham’s case would have been facilitated if all actors in the process, 
including the court, had had access to the same detailed information about the 
consequences of his guilty plea. 
The idea of compiling collateral consequences for each jurisdiction was 
carried forward from the Standards into the 2009 Uniform Collateral 
Consequences of Conviction Act promulgated by the Uniform Law 
Commission.169  To assist states in what seemed a daunting compilation 
endeavor, Congress directed the Department of Justice to carry out a 
nationwide survey of collateral consequences,170 a project now underway 
under the auspices of the American Bar Association.  The ABA research 
project will create a comprehensive searchable database, but it will remain for 
particular jurisdictions to put this data into useable form,171 and to keep it 
 
 166. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 167. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486. 
 168. Id.; see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY Standard 14-
3.1(c)(iv) (noting that the prosecuting attorney may “enter an agreement with the defendant 
regarding the disposition of related civil matters . . . including civil penalties and/or civil 
forfeiture”). 
 169. See UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT § 4 (2010). 
 170. See Love, supra note 7, at 785 n.136. 
At one point in the enactment process, the project nearly foundered over objections from 
commissioners that compiling so many laws and regulations would place too great a 
burden on the states.  The day was saved when United States Senator Patrick Leahy, chair 
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, was persuaded that this was an area where the federal 
government should provide some assistance to the states.  And so it came about that the 
Court Security Act of 2007 included a provision requiring the National Institute of Justice 
to undertake a fifty-state survey of all collateral consequences—both sanctions and 
disqualifications. 
Id. (citing Court Security Improvement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-177, 121 Stat. 2534). 
 171. See Chin, supra note 150, at 686–87.  Chin points out that there is “a trade-off between 
completeness of information and usability,” and recommends that data on consequences be 
“digested into readily usable form” for the crimes that are most frequently charged.  Id. at 686.  
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updated as new laws are passed and existing laws are amended.172  In addition 
to this national project, state-specific compilations are underway in Ohio and 
North Carolina.173 
2. Limitation of Collateral Sanctions 
The second necessary reform is to make most status-generated penalties 
subject to administrative waiver.  If collateral penalties are not “certain” in the 
sense that they are not automatic and categorical but subject to case-by-case 
imposition, there is less need for a defender to warn a client about them.  
Anyone convicted of a crime can anticipate having to defend themselves in an 
inquiry into their character and fitness by a licensing board or administrative 
agency, and nothing more than the most general warning in this regard should 
be necessary.  Collateral Sanctions Standard 19-2.2 would accomplish this by 
limiting situations in which a legislature could impose a “collateral sanction” 
(or automatic penalty) to those in which it “cannot reasonably contemplate any 
circumstance in which imposing the sanction would not be justified.”174  The 
commentary to this Standard explains that this requirement “places a heavy 
burden of justification on the legislature where automatic collateral penalties 
are concerned.”175  Examples of restrictions that are “obviously . . . necessary 
and appropriate” are “exclusion of those convicted of sexual abuse from 
employment involving close contact with children, loss of public office upon 
conviction of bribery, denial of licensure where the offense involves the 
licensed activity, and prohibition of firearms to those convicted of violent 
offenses.”176  However, many other categorical sanctions are hard to justify, 
such as automatic denial of student aid or revocation of a driver’s license upon 
conviction of a drug offense.  As a general matter, “[a]bsolute barriers to 
employment or licensure are problematic, particularly where no time limitation 
is specified and no waiver or relief mechanisms is provided.”177  While “it may 
 
While these digests will not cover all consequences for all crimes, “it will be much more useful 
that presenting attorneys or clients with an undifferentiated list of hundreds or thousands of 
collateral consequences.”  Id. at 687. 
 172. See id. (“[U]nless [the ABA compilation] is maintained, it will become increasingly 
obsolete and unreliable,” and become “useable only as the basis for preliminary research.”).  See 
discussion, supra note 164, for the additional inquiry that may be required to ascertain 
consequences that are imposed by contract as opposed to statute or regulation. 
 173. See Chin, supra note 150, at 687 n.39 (describing the North Carolina compilation); Civil 
Impacts of Criminal Convictions Under Ohio Law, OFFICE OF THE OHIO PUB. DEFENDER, 
http://opd.ohio.gov/CIVICC/ (May 10, 2011). 
 174. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND 
DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS Standard 19-2.2 (3d. ed. 2004). 
 175. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND 
DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS Standard 19-2.2 cmt. 
 176. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 177. Id. 
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be appropriate to revoke a driver’s license or exclude from aid on a case-by-
case basis . . . it is unreasonable and counterproductive to deny all drug 
offenders access to the means of rehabilitating themselves and supporting their 
families, thereby imposing a cost on the community with no evident 
corresponding benefit.”178 
Instead, the Standards provide that any adverse action taken against an 
individual on grounds relating to their conviction should be based upon the 
conduct constituting the offense, not upon the fact of conviction alone.  
Standard 19-3.1 provides that adverse action based upon that conduct should 
not be taken at all unless it “would provide a substantial basis for 
disqualification even if the person had not been convicted.”179  In a word, a 
convicted person should be judged by the conduct he or she was found to have 
engaged in, not by the status acquired as a result. 
If these principles had been applied to the pension forfeiture at issue in 
Joseph Abraham’s case, conviction would not have resulted automatically in 
the loss of his pension, but rather the appropriateness of this severe penalty in 
his particular case would have been considered by the state public employees’ 
retirement board or a similar agency.  Because the consequence would no 
longer have been a “certain” result of conviction but rather dependent upon 
subsequent discretionary administrative action, it would not have been the sort 
of consequence to which the principles underlying the Padilla holding would 
apply, and therefore it would not have distorted the plea process.  Converting 
automatic sanctions into discretionary administrative penalties means that they 
will no longer figure so prominently in the plea negotiations, and a failure to 
warn a client about them will not threaten the stability of pleas.  While it is of 
course helpful for defense lawyers to be able to warn their clients that 
conviction will harm their reputation and likely make it harder to establish 
good character, the advisement function does not bear the constitutional freight 
of an automatic sanction.  Prosecutors should have an interest in pressing the 
legislature for this sort of substantive reform.180 
It will take a certain amount of political will in legislatures to roll back the 
regime of categorical sanctions that has characterized the past two decades, 
 
 178. Id.  Section 7 of the Uniform Act limits collateral sanctions to those specifically 
authorized by statute, but contains no standard to guide legislatures in deciding whether to impose 
one.  See Love, supra note 7, at 784 & n.132 (noting that the Uniform Act deals with procedural 
issues only, and “[does] not address a number of normative issues that [are] addressed in the 
ABA [Collateral Sanctions] Standards”). 
 179. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND 
DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS Standard 19-3.1. 
 180. See Bibas, supra note 4, at 1158 (“If full disclosure of overly harsh collateral 
consequences causes many defendants to balk at pleading guilty, prosecutors may press for 
reforms.  They may urge legislatures either to curtail collateral consequences, or at least to make 
them waivable as part of plea bargains . . . .”). 
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just as it will then take courage for administrative agencies to apply 
discretionary penalties in a fair and reasonable manner.  Allowing courts to 
waive certain penalties, as discussed, may be a middle ground that will allow 
legislatures to avoid having to take direct action to repeal them. 
3. Relief from Collateral Sanctions 
The third key reform to limit the disruptive effect of collateral 
consequences on the plea process is to make relief from collateral penalties 
easily accessible and routinely available.181  Where it is not possible to avoid a 
particular collateral sanction through negotiation at plea or sentencing, 
jurisdictions should provide a way to mitigate its effect through durational 
limits or administrative relief measures. 
The Collateral Sanctions Standards provide several opportunities to avoid 
or mitigate collateral sanctions.  Standard 19-2.4 provides that a court at 
sentencing should be authorized to take them into account in determining the 
overall sentence.182  Standard 19-2.5 provides that a court (or administrative 
agency) should be authorized “to enter an order waiving, modifying, or 
granting timely and effective relief from any collateral sanction.”183  There will 
be occasions when “timely and effective” relief can only be granted at 
sentencing itself, as where a defendant sentenced to probation will otherwise 
lose his job or home or, like Joseph Abraham, his retirement income.  And, the 
availability of relief from collateral sanctions in post-conviction proceedings 
has been held relevant in constitutional challenges to their imposition in the 
first instance.184 
 
 181. More than two hundred years ago, in the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton spoke 
of the “necessary severity” of the criminal code that requires “an easy access to exceptions in 
favor of unfortunate guilt,” lest justice “wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel.”  THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 447 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 182. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND 
DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS Standard 19-2.4. 
 183. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND 
DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS Standard 19-2.5(a).  The 
commentary to Standard 19-2.5 provides that “[j]urisdictions could choose to allow the waiver 
authority to be exercised at the time of sentencing, or at some later date.”  ABA STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF 
CONVICTED PERSONS Standard 19-2.5 cmt.; see Love, supra note 7, at 781–82 (analyzing the 
“timely and effective” requirement of Standard 19-2.5). 
 184. I have argued elsewhere that Padilla gives new force to an argument that criminal 
offenders are entitled to a chance at forgiveness.  See Margaret Colgate Love, The Collateral 
Consequences of Padilla v. Kentucky: Is Forgiveness Now Constitutionally Required?, 160 U. 
PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 113, 114 (2011); see also State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 26 (Me. 2009) 
(“The retroactive application of the lifetime registration requirement and quarterly in-person 
verification procedures of SORNA of 1999 to offenders originally sentenced subject to SORA of 
1991 and SORNA of 1995, without, at a minimum, affording those offenders any opportunity to 
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At the present time, few jurisdictions have mechanisms in place that 
provide comprehensive relief from status-generated consequences.185  New 
York is the only state that allows courts at sentencing to waive collateral 
penalties to permit defendants who are not prison-bound to avoid eviction and 
keep their jobs.186  As to post-sentence relief, even in the heyday of 
rehabilitative sentencing, no U.S. jurisdiction ever adopted anything 
comparable to the concept of “rehabilitation” in the French Criminal Code187 
 
ever be relieved of the duty as was permitted under those laws, is, by the clearest proof, punitive, 
and violates the Maine and United States Constitutions’ prohibitions against ex post facto laws.”); 
Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 882 N.E.2d 298, 309 (Mass. 2008) (“[T]he 
retroactive imposition of the registration requirement without an opportunity to overcome the 
conclusive presumption of dangerousness that flows solely from Doe’s conviction, violates his 
right to due process under the Massachusetts Constitution.”).  The Padilla Court pointed out, 
respecting pre-1996 immigration law, that “‘preserving the possibility of’ discretionary relief 
from deportation . . . ‘would have been one of the principal benefits sought by defendants 
deciding whether to accept a plea offer or instead to proceed to trial.’”  Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 
S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010) (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 (2001)).  It emphasized that 
the law no longer provides for such discretionary relief, either from the courts or from the 
executive, so that deportation in a case like Padilla’s is now “practically inevitable.”  Id. at 1480. 
 185. See MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, RELIEF FROM THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF A 
CRIMINAL CONVICTION: A STATE-BY-STATE RESOURCE GUIDE ix–xiii, 6–17 (2006). 
While every jurisdiction provides at least one way that convicted persons can avoid or 
mitigate the collateral consequences of conviction, the actual mechanisms for relief are 
generally inaccessible and unreliable, and are frequently not well understood even by 
those responsible for administering them.  Relief mechanisms of the same nominal type 
(e.g., pardon, expungement, sealing, set-aside) vary widely in effect and availability from 
state to state, and there is no national model to which state or federal authorities seeking 
guidance may refer.  There is also no central clearinghouse of information about state and 
federal restoration of rights mechanisms, so that authorities in one state have little or no 
information about law and practice even in their neighboring states.  Often officials 
responsible for administering one type of relief are unaware of alternatives available in 
their own state for mitigating or avoiding collateral consequences.  Federal regulatory 
schemes sometimes give effect to state pardon and expungement remedies, apparently 
without considering their wide variation.  Few jurisdictions provide information about 
avenues of relief from collateral disabilities to offenders leaving prison or completing 
probation, even where the law requires that this be done.  It is often unclear what if any 
relief may be available for persons with convictions from other jurisdictions.  The scope 
or effect of relief is also not well-understood, either by those seeking it or by those 
responsible for administering it. 
Id. at x. 
 186. See MARGARET LOVE & APRIL FRAZIER, CERTIFICATES OF REHABILITATION AND 
OTHER FORMS OF RELIEF FROM THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION: A SURVEY 
OF STATE LAWS 2–6 (2006), available at http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/comm.upload/ 
CR209800/sitesofinterest_files/AllStatesBriefing.Sheet10106.pdf. 
 187. See Damaska, supra note 90, at 565 (noting that the French Code process automatically 
“vacates the judgment of conviction and puts an end to all disqualifications flowing therefrom”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES AFTER PADILLA V. KENTUCKY 125 
or “expiry” in the English Rehabilitation of Offenders Act of 1974.188  And, as 
collateral penalties have ratcheted up over the past twenty years, what relief 
mechanisms there were have atrophied.189  The pardon power is rarely used 
even in jurisdictions where it is the sole form of relief,190 and expungement and 
other mechanisms that depend upon concealment have become increasingly 
unreliable in light of modern technology and pervasive background 
checking.191  While a number of states have laws regulating consideration of 
conviction in employment and licensing decisions, few have an effective 
enforcement mechanism.192  The recent official interest in providing certain 
kinds of support to former prisoners reentering the community has not yet 
extended to providing convicted persons, including those who left prison years 
ago or who never went to prison at all, with some realistic hope of restoring 
their legal status and reputation.  Understanding the reasons for this “studied 
official ignorance about and indifference to collateral consequences” is 
essential to overcoming it.193 
 
 188. See KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
224 (1989).  England has not been immune from the recent trend toward more restrictive laws.  
See Andrew von Hirsch & Martin Wasik, Civil Disqualifications Attending Conviction: A 
Suggested Conceptual Framework, 56 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 599, 603 (1997) (reporting on the “clear 
trend” in English law for employment disqualifications “to increase in number and complexity”). 
 189. See generally Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate: In Praise of a 
Forgotten Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1707–15 (2003) 
(providing historical background). 
 190. See LOVE, supra note 185, at 18–38. 
 191. If scholars and practitioners have in the past questioned expungement as “too costly in 
both moral and legal terms,” Marc A. Franklin & Diane Johnsen, Expunging Criminal Records: 
Concealment and Dishonesty in an Open Society, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 733, 735 (1981), nowadays 
the greater concern is that remedies premised on concealment ignore the technological realities of 
the information age, Pierre H. Bergeron & Kimberly A. Eberwine, One Step in the Right 
Direction: Ohio’s Framework for Sealing Criminal Records, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 595, 609 (2005) 
(“[T]he individual may have to live the rest of his life with a cloud over his head and hope that his 
secret is never revealed.”).  See also Bernard Kogon & Donald L. Loughery, Jr., Sealing and 
Expungement of Criminal Records—The Big Lie, 61 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 
378, 389 (1970) (criticizing expungement on grounds that it precludes necessary reconciliation 
between a criminal offender and the community harmed). 
 192. See LOVE, supra note 185, at 62–84 (noting that only a handful of states include 
conviction in their fair employment practices laws). 
 193. Id. at 15. 
[T]here is a certain level of studied official ignorance about and indifference to collateral 
consequences, even among those responsible for helping people with convictions reenter 
the community.  This is largely because collateral consequences have traditionally been 
regarded as civil and regulatory rather than penal in nature, so that the process of avoiding 
or mitigating them has not been thought of as part of the criminal process, or even as any 
business of the justice system.  Researchers and practitioners have pointed out the impact 
of this indefinite exposure to collateral penalties on recidivism rates, but this has evidently 
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To summarize, the ABA Standards specify three key reforms that are 
necessary to implement the Padilla decision in a practical and efficient way: 
they 1) ensure that all parties to a criminal case can understand what those 
consequences are so that they can be factored into the overall penalty; 2) limit 
the range of consequences that occur automatically as a result of conviction 
and require case-by-case consideration of the conduct underlying the 
conviction; and 3) require that the court (or an administrative body) be able to 
waive them in a “timely and effective” manner.  These three reforms would 
minimize the extent to which a plea agreement necessarily implicates 
consequences over and above the sentence imposed by the court, leaving the 
parties free to negotiate over the disposition of charges without the distraction 
represented by harsh categorical sanctions that frequently bear little 
relationship to the crime.  In this fashion, Padilla’s requirements could be 
more efficiently satisfied, and a fairer outcome would be assured for 
defendants.  Not least among the advantages of these reforms would be to 
justify any limitations on convicted persons’ ability to function in society in 
both moral and utilitarian terms. 
CONCLUSION 
Once in a generation a Supreme Court decision transforms the landscape of 
criminal defense.  In 1963 it was Gideon v. Wainwright,194 in 1984 it was 
Strickland,195 and in 2010 it was Padilla.  The Padilla Court imposed a degree 
of constitutional discipline on the guilty plea process, evidently recognizing 
that a guilty plea is “no longer a negligible exception to the norm of trials; it is 
the norm.”196  Padilla also recognized that criminal defendants considering a 
guilty plea are exposed to a range of collateral penalties about which they may 
know little or nothing when they come to the bargaining table, but which may 
change their lives forever, and not for the better.  As Padilla is interpreted and 
applied in the lower courts, it is becoming clear that its logic cannot be easily 
restricted to the immigration context.  Commonwealth v. Abraham vividly 
illustrates how the modern regime of collateral consequences distorts the 
criminal justice system and threatens to destabilize the plea process on which 
that system has come to depend.  The case thus offers more than just an 
opportunity to clarify defense counsel’s Sixth Amendment advisement 
obligations in the plea process and to contrast them with the court’s more 
limited obligations under the Due Process Clause.  It also offers the other 
 
made little impression on elected officials, who tend to avoid any issue that may expose 
them to criticism for being soft on crime and criminals. 
Id. 
 194. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 195. 466 U.S. 668 (1983). 
 196. Bibas, supra note 4, at 1138. 
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branches of government an opportunity to consider whether they have gone too 
far in applying collateral penalties in a categorical and unduly punitive way. 
Because the parties to plea negotiations must be able to deal with the 
immediate issues presented by the criminal case without the distractions 
represented by a defendant’s concerns about the collateral consequences of 
conviction, Padilla will in time lead away from the punitive model illustrated 
by the pension forfeiture in Abraham toward an administrative law model, 
where penalties are reasonably related to the criminal conduct, and more 
flexibly applied.  When prosecutors find it harder to craft acceptable plea 
offers because of collateral sanctions, when defendants are willing to risk 
going to trial to avoid them, and when judges are moved to set pleas aside 
because the agreed-upon deal later seems unfair, the system of collateral 
consequences that traps so many in a degraded social status must change.  As 
Professor Bibas has argued respecting the procedural aspects of the plea 
process,197 substantively too the move toward a consumer protection model 




 197. See id. at 1153–59. 
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